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1 
ABSTRACT: ​ Much has been written on the provision of arms and technologies from countries 
such as France, West and East Germany, the USSR, USA, UK, and others to Iraq during Saddam 
Hussein’s war against Iran. This literature, however, tends to gloss over the material impact that 
aid had on the development of Iraq’s military industrial complex as well as the combined 
material impact on the war of those arms and, more importantly, Iraq’s ability to develop its 
industrial base. As a result, this literature obfuscates the agency Iraq had in exploiting these 
foreign states’ callous desire for arms sales to develop an independent and self-sufficient native 
arms industry. In this paper, Western academic sources, Iraqi, and Iranian perspectives on the 
war and military industry are examined to argue that Iraq was successful in building its 
military-industrial complex by Iraq’s own standards and to a level Iraq required to force an 
eventual capitulation in the war. The Iraqi development will be tracked in relation to the pivotal 
battles surrounding the al-Fao peninsula in 1986-88 as well as a frame narrative constructed 
surrounding a Soviet-made T-55 main battle tank and its life as one of billions of items of aid 
provided to Iraq during the time period examined. The al-Fao battles and the T-55 are both 
emblematic of Iraq’s specific needs and political, economic, and military context and so a close 
examination of both is helpful in understanding the broader picture. 
* * * 
INTRODUCTION: ​ The end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War saw 
an unprecedented expansion of the international arms market. As the two primary rivals in this 
global war of influence, the Soviet Union and the United States spent enormous amounts of 
money and resources on building and expanding their own militaries as well as on arming states 
in the developing world. Between 1955 and 1979, military aid to developing countries from the 
2 
Soviet Union alone increased from $300 million to $6.6 billion annually.  The Cold War saw less 1
developed countries take an increasingly important role in the world of arms imports and exports 
with their share of the export market expanding from 5.9 percent in the early 1960s to 16.6 
percent in the late 1970s.  2
Thus many less developed countries not only exponentially increased their military 
capabilities but also, in a notable departure from the previous paradigm in which only a handful 
of states possessed such capabilities, often did so with the intention of designing and 
manufacturing arms of their own. 
Iraq was one of these countries. Iraq’s development, however, came at an extremely high 
cost in human life. When everything Saddam Hussein had built came crashing down in the few 
short years after the conclusion of the eight year long and intensely brutal Iran-Iraq war, the 
complicity of those who helped build his war machine was revealed. The symbiotic relationships 
among superpowers, the international arms industry, and ambitious leaders such as Saddam must 
be examined and learned from to prevent a repeat of the horrors of the Iran-Iraq war. 
When Saddam Hussein took power in 1968, Iraq was at the lowest level of military 
self-sufficiency described by Timothy Hoyt in ​Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy.  3
As a level one state, it was almost completely reliant for all of its arms purchases on the Soviet 
Union, a level five state. Military self-sufficiency, of course, not only includes prominent 
systems such as aircraft, missiles, and so on but every type of equipment needed to conduct 
1 Kanet, ‘Soviet Military Assistance,’ ​Communist Nations’ Military Assistance, ​pg. 44 
2 Hoyt, ​Military Industry, ​pg. 6 
3 Described by Hoyt on pg. 9. In summary, Hoyt describes five levels of production, beginning with level 
one, in which the state relies entirely on purchases from foreign state and ends with level five, in which 
the state has a matured military industry and is capable of independently designing and producing all 
weapon systems. 
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military operations, from boots to tents to radar systems.  In 1968, Iraq not only produced almost 4
nothing of military use within its own borders but also had little of the required skilled human 
resources to maintain its weapons, let alone to design and produce new ones. 
Saddam, however, was ambitious not only on a personal but also a national scale. 
Throughout his reign, he leveraged the conflicts in which Iraq was embroiled together with its oil 
wealth to purchase more and more arms from an increasingly broad range of suppliers and to 
negotiate more and more favorable terms that included not just hardware but also technical 
support both with the equipment itself and with his own nascent manufacturing endeavors. 
Climbing the rungs of Hoyt’s ladder of development, Iraq stood poised in 1990 on the brink of 
joining the United States, the Soviet Union, and others as a level five state, capable not only of 
producing and designing its own arms of also of supplying those indigenous arms to others. 
Although the plentiful literature on the subject often discusses how the world armed Iraq, 
the truth is that Iraq armed itself. Thus, under the supervision of Saddam Hussein, Iraq undertook 
an independently motivated development project that within two decades transformed Iraq from 
a country with little in the way of military industry to one of the  most powerful states in the 
Middle East. Though Iraq’s arms development program may have been crude by the standards of 
the superpowers, it was successful in that it was the key element in concluding the Iran-Iraq war 
on Iraqi terms in 1988. 
 
4 Hoyt, pg. 3 
4 
Level One: 
In the initial under-industrialized state, the LDC [less developed country] purchases 
foreign weapons systems, and relies heavily on foreign trainers, technicians, and advisors.  5
 
In 1967, even as Iraq was severing diplomatic relations with the United States in the 
wake of the disastrous Six-Day Arab-Israeli War,  the last T-55A tanks rolled off the production 6
line of the No. 75 Tank Plant in Kharkov, in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, near the 
border of Russia. The T-55 and then the T-55A had had a long and illustrious history but their 
time in the Soviet Army was over. A more advanced model, the T-62, had become the primary 
tank in the Soviet arsenal. The Soviets would continue to build the T-55A, of course - it was too 
useful to scrap and it was one of their most popular products in the global arms market - but 
production and series modifications continued only at the No. 13 Plant in Omsk and solely for 
export, mostly to the fast-growing Middle Eastern market. 
One of the last of the T-55A tanks built at Kharkov was Tank #5210-005.  Like its 7
brothers before it, its ancestry could be traced to the Second World War, which had spurred a 
revolution in tank design among all combatants. The Soviet Union’s infamous T-34 medium tank 
had been a great success despite being a stopgap measure brought on by the necessities of total 
war. The Soviets wanted something better. Aleksandr Morozov, a highly skilled tank designer, 
5 Hoyt,​ ​pg. 9 
6 “A Guide to the United States’ History of Recognition,” US Department of State 
7 The story told here of the production and fate of #5210-005 is both factual and imagined.  Indeed, a T 
55A tank with the serial number 5210-005 was shipped to Iraq, modified, and captured in 1991.  If it exists 
at all, the data on this tank’s production and service record in the Soviet Union remain virtually impossible 
to access somewhere in a Russian or Ukrainian military archive.  The details of the story of its service and 
modification in Iraq are similarly impossible to retrieve.  The imagined details of # 5210-005’s production, 
service, and modification, however, are not only within the realm of the probable but also could apply to 
thousands of tanks produced in the Soviet Union that saw service with Iraq in the Iran/Iraq war. 
Information on #5210-005 was sourced from preservedtanks.com 
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designed the T-44 tank which had the light weight and mobility of a T-34 but also the armor 
protection and heavy gun of a tank such as the German Panther, a tank designed specifically to 
counter the T-34 and which had been the T-34’s main rival on the Eastern Front. By 1947, 
almost two thousand T-44s had been built at the same Kharkov tank plant where #5210-005 was 
later produced. The T-44 was soon superseded by the T-54-1 and its successor, the T-54-2, 
which provided the bigger D-10 100mm gun, a larger turret, a more powerful engine, thicker 
frontal armor, and other improvements which collectively greatly improved overall performance. 
The next generation in #5210-005’s past had connections to America. In the 1950s, 
Morozov moved his tank design bureau to the Kharkov No. 75 plant and redesigned the T-54-2 
with some technological improvements gleaned from American-made M4 Sherman tanks 
obtained by the Soviets as lend-lease equipment in the Second World War and American M26 
and M46 tanks captured by the Chinese during the Korean War. Certain technologies within 
these tanks were studied to add new features to Morozov’s design, which improved gun stability 
for greater accuracy and removed noxious cannon fumes from the turret. An upgraded D-10 gun 
was added, as well as a Tsh-21-22 telescopic sight, a TVN-1 infrared periscope, an R-113 radio, 
and improved air filtering systems. Thousands of these new T-54As were produced at factories 
within the Soviet Union and allied Warsaw Pact states.  8
#5210-005’s own family - the T-55 - began when the Soviet Army requested a tank that 
could survive on the nuclear battlefield. Morozov’s design crew retained the original T-54 
design and all its adjustments and then added features for protection from radiological and 
chemical threats, including an atmospheric overpressure system to prevent radioactive dust or 
8 Zaloga, ​T-54/55 Main Battle Tank, ​ pg. 4-10 
6 
chemical agents from entering the tank due to the high pressure inside. The turret had to be 
slightly redesigned to accommodate the protections and a new, more powerful V-55 engine was 
fitted as well as an improved transmission box. The newly dubbed T-55 tank entered production 
in June 1958. In August 1963, some new modifications were adopted and the T-55A began 
rolling off the assembly lines in Kharkov, Nizhni Tagil, and Omsk.  9
With all this legacy of improvement - of increasing gun firepower, armor strength, gun 
accuracy, and resistance to the hazards of the modern battlefield - #5210-005 was among the 
last of its generation to be built at Kharkov. At the end of a short winter day in 1967, #5210-005 
was driven out of the No.75 Tank Plant and onto a seemingly endless train where it began the 
journey that would end twenty-four years later on a battlefield in Kuwait. 
* * * 
When Saddam Hussein first gained power in Iraq in 1968, he had grand ambitions to one 
day become the leader of the entire Arab world. This task would not be easy, as both the Arab 
nations he hoped to lead and Iraq were deeply embroiled in conflict. Since 1948, Arab states 
such as Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq itself had been in almost constant conflict with 
the newly established state of Israel. In 1967, Israel preemptively invaded Egypt. In the 
confusion that immediately followed, Israel seized the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza from Egypt, 
East Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan, and the Golan heights from Syria. The armies of 
Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and their allies were poorly equipped and poorly trained in 1967, and as a 
result were swiftly defeated in less than a week - six days, to be exact. Former Iraqi general 
Ra’ad Hamdani remembers that school was canceled and people cried in the streets when word 
9 Zaloga, ​T-54/55 Main Battle Tank, ​pg. 10-14 
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of the war’s end was announced. The defeat of the Arab armies in the war of 1967 was a horrible 
shock for the ideology of Arab Nationalism and the hope of many in the Middle East. The 
resignation of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser and, to some extent, Saddam’s 1968 coup 
were direct results of popular unrest from the Arab armies’ terrible defeat in the war.  10
Meanwhile Iraq was dealing with two serious security threats: one external from Iran, and 
one internally from the Kurdish minority in the north of the country. Iran, ruled by the 
US-backed Pahlavi monarchy, had been in low-level conflict with Iraq for years. Their 
disagreement stemmed from two main factors, the first being Iran’s hold on the province of 
Khuzestan, in Iran’s southwest along the Iraqi border. Iraq had seen the province as rightfully 
Iraqi since at least 1958 under Iraqi president Abdul Karim Qasim due to its large Arab 
population. The other key factor in the dispute centered around where to draw the border line in 
the vitally important Shatt al-Arab waterway, one of Iraq’s only links to the Persian Gulf and 
which marked the geographical border between the two nations. Iran wanted the line drawn on 
the Iraqi side, granting Iran full control of the river. Iraq wanted the opposite, granting Iraq full 
control of the river. The various compromise lines that had been drawn satisfied neither party. 
The initial border had been drawn centuries earlier during the Ottoman period, and reified in a 
series of treaties up through the independence of Iraq from the United Kingdom in the 1930s.  11
Perhaps even more pertinent to Iraq’s precarious military situation was a crippling 
conflict against Kurdish separatists led by Mustafa Barzani in the north of the country, supported 
by the Iranian monarchy, which wielded its oil wealth and political influence to purchase vast 
quantities of arms from the United States and United Kingdom and which passed along much of 
10 Woods, ​Saddam’s War, ​pg. 20 
11 Tehrani, ‘Iraqi Attitudes and Interpretations,’ ​The Politics of Aggression,  ​pg. 11-12 
8 
their vast arsenal to the Kurdish militias.  Military strength and national security were crucial 12
issues for Iraq for the entirety of its as-yet brief existence, and it was in this political and social 
milieu that Saddam Hussein grew up in. 
Saddam Hussein was born to a poor and domestically troubled Tikriti family in April of 
1937. His uncle, Khairallah al-Tulfah had raised him with tales of the Iraqi army’s exploits, and 
at age twenty he committed his first assassination as a member of the Iraqi Ba’ath party.  Less 13
than ten years later, he would be perhaps the most powerful man in Iraq, after a dramatic coup in 
which he rode an army tank through the gates of the palace and beat the head of the army, 
Colonel Abdel Razzaq an-Nayef, senseless and personally escorted him at gunpoint onto a flight 
to political exile in Morocco.  After the July 1968 coup, Saddam would share power with his 1415
cousin, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. The new regime set about ridding Iraq of political opponents in a 
systematic and highly efficient campaign of assassinations and kidnappings orchestrated by 
Hussein and his unique mixture of ambition and ability to get things done, no matter the cost.   16
Saddam’s meteoric rise to power was emblematic of his goals for Iraq and his methods of 
achieving them: lofty ambitions executed in a blunt and often brutal manner. Saddam’s arms 
development plan which he began to formulate immediately after taking office was unique in 
that he did not wish to create Iraq’s military industry in order to jumpstart civilian industry or to 
earn cash off of exports, but for specific pragmatic requirements directly related to Iraq’s unique 
military context.  While the money that Saddam planned to spend could have been spent on 17
12 Timmerman, ​The Death Lobby, ​pg. 16 
13 Timmerman, pg. 1-2 
14 Timmerman, pg. 8 
15 ​ Colonel an-Nayef would be assassinated in London by Iraqi agents in 1978 at Saddam’s 
order. 
16 Timmerman, pg. 9 
17 Hoyt, pg. 115 
9 
civilian development or social welfare programs, Saddam believed that his ambitious goals to be 
the powerful leader of the Arabs would only be achieved through decisive victory in a war.  As 18
such, immediately addressing Iraq’s military situation was paramount. 
When Saddam took power, Iraq had a mere 92,000 troops in its military and spent $250 
million on defense annually. Iraq had just a single armored division, with fewer than five 
hundred tanks, mostly older Soviet models such as the T-34, T-54, with the newest model being 
the T-55.  A handful of older British-made Centurion tanks and World War Two-era American 
M24 Chaffee light tanks were in Iraq’s inventory as well. Those tanks were supplemented by 
fewer than one hundred armored personnel carriers, mostly Soviet-made BTR-152s with twenty 
British-made Ferret armored cars. The air force had been built almost entirely after the 1958 
military coup which switched Iraq’s military patron from the United Kingdom to the Soviet 
Union, and as a result consisted mostly of Soviet aircraft. Iraq’s combat aircraft inventory 
consisted of sixty MiG-21 interceptors, forty-five MiG-17/19 fighters, twenty Su-7 
fighter-bombers. All were 1950s-era Soviet models. In addition to the Soviet jets, Iraq had fifty 
old British Hawker Hunter Mk. 9 ground attack jets leftover from the pre-1958 air force.  19
Furthermore, almost all of Iraq’s military relied on Soviet assistance and training, even for basic 
maintenance. The Soviets had refused to give the Iraqis any independence on the weapons they 
bought from the USSR, even requiring that engines in need of repair be sent back to the Soviet 
Union.  20
The Soviets had sold a research reactor to Iraq back in the 1960s where it was housed in 
Thuwaitha, south of Baghdad, but Iraq’s higher education system was small and underdeveloped. 
18 Woods, pg. 33 
19 Dupuy, ​Almanac of World Military Power, ​pg. 157-158 
20 Timmerman, pg. 27 
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Iraq would need to increase its focus on education to turn the reactor into more than an 
educational tool. Iraq’s reliance on the Soviet Union for even the most basic necessities meant 
that it lacked a firm industrial base, let alone a skilled workforce.  21
To compound these problems, Iraq’s military was poorly trained and consisted largely of 
young conscripts without a strong education.  As a result of the humiliating defeat in the 1967 22
war with Israel, military leadership across the Middle East began to seriously consider what kind 
of structure and strategies would be needed to prevent such a disaster from happening ever again. 
The Iraqi army, which had served to a small extent in the 1967 war, restructured itself around a 
Soviet model with the help of advisors from the Soviet army. Perhaps most importantly, they 
realized the need for effective combined arms warfare, namely efficient cooperation between the 
various branches within the military. An assault is far more effective if infantry, armored 
vehicles, artillery, and air support all work in tandem to achieve the goal. Israel’s ability to 
coordinate their forces was key to their victory in 1967, and Iraq and the other Arab armies set 
about learning how to achieve this as well. This was not an easy goal, however, as military 
technology by this time had largely outstripped the ability of a poorly educated and poorly 
trained conscript to use it effectively.  23
A series of events following Saddam’s rise to power quickly led Saddam to formulate and 
begin implementation of a plan to develop Iraq’s industrial and military strength - a worsening 
situation with the Kurds culminating in Russia’s refusal to sell more arms to Iraq, the eruption of 
further hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and the conflict with Iran escalating. 
21 Timmerman, pg. 28 
22 Dupuy, pg. 156 
23 Woods, pg. 21 
11 
During the first days of Saddam’s reign in 1968 and 1969 and despite Iraq’s weak 
military state, Saddam attempted to tackle head on Iraq’s security concerns with the Kurds, 
escalating the conflict against them into open warfare. The Iraqi army, however, utterly failed to 
suppress the Kurdish militias and the Soviet Union threatened to cut off arms sales if the brutal 
war continued.  After a humiliating visit to Moscow in January of 1970 in which Soviet 24
President Aleksey Kosygin stubbornly refused to yield to Iraq’s demands, Saddam returned to 
Iraq and negotiated a deal with Barzani - hostilities would end and Iraq would accept limited 
Kurdish autonomy, but this autonomy would not come into effect for four years. Saddam 
believed this would be sufficient time to win on his own terms.  As a result of the dual 25
humiliations of the Soviet arms embargo and the Kurdish semi-victory, Saddam began 
formulating a plan to turn Iraq into a fully self-sufficient military-industrial power. It was clear to 
Saddam that the current military status quo and it's heavy reliance on arms from the Soviet 
Union was untenable. The Soviets’ terms gave them a significant amount of power over Iraqi 
military policy, and Saddam resented those chains.  
Thus the first step of his plan was to begin purchasing weapons from nations other than 
the USSR, and Saddam believed that the best choice was France.  Although Iraq had a poorly 26
equipped military and little in the way of industry, it did have vast amounts of oil. Believing he 
could wield his country’s natural resources to get anything he wanted from any country he set his 
sights on, in 1972 Saddam made his first pilgrimage to Paris, meeting French President Georges 
Pompidou. He made a small purchase - a few Alouette helicopters and Panhard armored cars - 
nothing to change the balance of power against either the Kurdish militias or Iran, but enough to 
24 Hoyt, pg. 124 
25 Timmerman, pg. 11 
26 Timmerman, pg. 12 
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whet both the Iraqi and French appetites for each other’s goods.  This first meeting with the 27
French seemed to indicate to Saddam that his ambitions could be realized, with the proper 
application of money. 
 Then, in October of 1973, Egypt and Syria launched an invasion of Israel. The war which 
followed seemed to harden Saddam’s convictions that broadening the base of military suppliers 
was absolutely necessary but also that his arsenal needed to include more advanced weapons 
than the Soviets were willing to sell. After 1967 in preparation for the next war, the Iraqi army 
had restructured on the Soviet model and extensively studied the Israeli military- their weapons, 
their tactics, their ideology, everything the Iraqi soldiers would need to understand how to 
change their own system to defeat their enemies. General Hamdani recounts his time as a 
lieutenant in Iraq’s 71st Brigade of the 3rd Armored Division: 
 “So in the 1973 confrontation, we had a much better understanding of the capability of 
our enemy; we knew largely what to expect. We had mainly focused on having the 
Israelis as our opponent. In 1967, we had the audacity, after putting all the Arab forces 
together, to ask, ‘Who is this Israeli force?’ But in 1973, we needed to exact revenge on 
the Israelis - that was the objective, regardless of the cost. When the combat started in 
1973, I was still a first lieutenant, but I was completely aware of the Israeli army’s 
leadership - the names and backgrounds of its generals. This shows you how much 
interest in studying the enemy we had. We considered ourselves in 1973 to be in a 
position to challenge the Israeli army. We witnessed how even after their losses they 
27 Timmerman, pg. 13 
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were able to come back and balance, to rebalance their position after the initial Arab 
gains in the 1973 fighting.”  28
Yet when Syria and Egypt invaded (after failing to inform Saddam of their secret plans), Israel 
was able to regroup and push them back, helped in large part, or so Saddam believed, by the 
delivery of enormous amounts of American weapons. American-made M60 Patton tanks in the 
Israeli army went toe to toe with Soviet-made T-54, T-55, and T-62 tanks in Egyptian and Syrian 
service, and soundly beat them despite being heavily outnumbered. French-made Mirage fighter 
jets shot Soviet-made MiGs out of the sky by the dozen. The Arab defeat in the war that was 
supposed to be their revenge for 1967 proved to Saddam once and for all that reliance on 
Soviet-made weapons was unsustainable not only because of the power it gave the USSR over 
Iraq, but also that the weapons they were willing to sell were simply inferior. If Iraq were to 
reach the heights Saddam envisioned for it, Iraq had to look to the West for its arms.   29
Saddam was focusing on the wrong military deficiency, however, as in reality the Arab 
armored forces were more than evenly matched against the Israelis. In the Sinai, Egyptian T-55 
and T-62 tanks were primarily arrayed against Israeli Centurion Shot tanks, an Israeli 
modification of the British-made Centurion main battle tank with a new engine and powerful L7 
rifled 105mm cannon. The Egyptian T-62s were more than evenly matched against the 
Centurions, with the advantage in armor protection, yet in one particularly bloody battle, the 
Egyptian 25th Armored Brigade lost eighty of its ninety-six T-62s and inflicted just four tank 
losses on the Israeli 217th Armored Brigade.  In Israeli-occupied Golan, Syrian T-62s again 30
went up against Israeli Centurions and even American-made World War II-era M4 Sherman 
28 Woods, pg. 22 
29 Timmerman, pg. 14 
30 Zaloga, ​T-62 Main Battle Tank, ​pg. 35 
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medium tanks, modified with more modern smoothbore 105mm cannons. The Syrians lost over 
five hundred tanks, mostly T-55 and T-62s, and inflicted about two hundred tank losses on the 
Israelis. An Israeli counterattack the next day routed the remaining Syrian troops, causing a 
general retreat by the entire Syrian army.  The T-62 was not a bad tank; in fact the Israelis 31
tended to believe that the Syrian and Egyptian tanks were better than their own vehicles, and its 
armor-piercing, fin-guided, discarding sabot (APFSDS) round was ingenious and extremely 
effective. Almost all modern tank guns use APFSDS rounds in tank-on-tank engagements, and it 
was the T-62 that introduced it.  The Syrians and Egyptians did not lose because of their 32
weapons, but because of their training. Israeli tank gunners were able to engage at up to 1500m 
while Syrians lacked the experience to reliable hit their targets past 1000m, leading to a decisive 
gap in engagements in which Israeli tanks could destroy Syrian tanks without the Syrian tanks 
being able to effectively respond.   33
Saddam Hussein either did not know or did not care about this fact and was determined 
that strength came through bigger, better, and more expensive weapons. Saddam, flush with 
cash, likely fell into the rather simple trap of believing the solution to Iraq’s military woes was 
one with the easiest solution, namely buying his way to victory. Addressing the more complex 
issues of training and professionalism was far more difficult to solve with money. The spike in 
oil prices instituted by OPEC after the 1973 war gave Saddam the opportunity and cash to put his 
ambitious development plan into high gear, and with the health of his co-leader Ahmed al-Bakr 
ailing, he was truly the most powerful man in Iraq. With the new money and total power, 
31 Zaloga, pg. 36-37 
32 Zaloga, pg. 38 
33 Zaloga, pg. 37 
15 
Saddam was at last able to begin active implementation of his plan to achieve military 
self-sufficiency. 
While Saddam began reaching out to buy new weapons, the conflicts which necessitated 
the military expansion continued. As 1974 began, the treaty calling for Kurdish autonomy signed 
between Saddam and Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani back in 1970 came to fruition. Of course, 
Saddam had no intention of giving autonomy to the Kurds, and the Kurds knew it. On March 11, 
Kurdish members of parliament in Baghdad walked out ​en masse, ​and within days the Iraqi army 
and Kurdish Peshmerga militias were clashing. The Iraqi army was not prepared. The Soviet 
Union, as it had during the last war against the Kurds, ended arms shipments to Iraq and refused 
to discuss the matter with Saddam at all. Iraqi forces quickly lost control of the situation, 
hunkering in their barracks at night and unable to gain any ground during the day. The 
Peshmerga gained control of most of Northern Iraq as Iraqi troops slowly but surely ran out of 
ammunition and bombs for their aircraft.   34
Iraq’s situation was all the more precarious because the internal conflict with the Kurds 
had another layer in the form of proxy conflict with Iran, who was arming the Peshmerga. Since 
Saddam had taken power in Iraq, the external security situation with Iraq had deteriorated 
significantly. Anti-Iranian rhetoric had increased, with Iraqi politicians declaring Khuzestan, a 
province on Iran’s southwestern border with Iraq, as “Arabistan” and “part of Iraq’s soil . . . 
annexed to Iran during foreign rule.”  An Iraqi television station broadcast a map of Iraq 35
showing Khuzestan as within Iraqi borders and another TV program showed maps with the 
names of Iranian cities changed to Arabic names and many were included within enlarged Iraqi 
34 Timmerman, pg. 22 
35 Tehrani, pg. 13 
16 
borders. Iraq was also actively supporting Arab separatist movements within Khuzestan and even 
encouraging a rebellion by ethnic Balochis in the restive Iranian province of Balochistan along 
Iran’s Pakistani border.  36
Moreover, Iraq’s original dispute with Iran over their shared border had grown to include 
a dispute over control of several islands in the Persian Gulf - Greater and Lesser Tonbs and Abu 
musa - which had been under British control until 1971 when the British withdrew the last of 
their forces from the Persian Gulf region (mostly in what is now the United Arab Emirates, 
Qatar, and Bahrain). Iran claimed its control over several of the islands though Iraq and several 
other Arab states protested vehemently, claiming that the United Arab Emirates were the islands’ 
rightful owners.  Iraq convened a meeting of the Arab League and proposed severance of all ties 37
with Iran. The proposal was rejected, but nonetheless Iraq followed through on its threats and 
severed diplomatic relations with Iran and expelled over 70000 Iranian citizens from Iraq. Along 
the Iraq-Iran border, skirmishes began to break out between the two countries between 1972 and 
1974, culminating in “Bloody Sunday” on February 10, 1974, in which heavy artillery and armor 
was used by both sides and heavy casualties sustained. On March 7, a ceasefire went into effect 
days before Iraq resumed its offensive against the Kurds. On the recommendations of UN special 
envoy Vickman Muñez, who had toured the border area, the Security Council ordered both sides 
to hold the ceasefire, to withdraw from the contested border areas, and to resume normal 
diplomatic relations.  The resolution was ignored, and border clashes continued, but diplomatic 38
relations were nominally restored.   39
36 Tehrani, pg. 13 
37 Encyclopaedia Iranica, Tonb Islands 
38 Tehrani, pg. 13 
39 Tehrani, pg. 14 
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More disastrously for Iraq, its renewed offensive against the Kurds at the end of March 
1974 gave the Iranians an opportunity to bloody Iraq’s nose without much risk to themselves, 
and as a result Iran began to send long convoys of weapons across the Zagros mountains into 
Kurdish territory, where Iranian troops helped unload the trucks. After a year of sustained 
failure, the Iraqis had taken, by Saddam’s count, 16,000 casualties and killed 40,000 Kurdish 
civilians. The Iraqi army was almost completely out of supplies and the air force had “only three 
bombs left.”  In early March of 1975, almost exactly a year after the war began, Saddam flew to 40
meet French president Jacques Chirac and pleaded for immediate and massive French assistance. 
Chirac balked at the scale of aid Saddam was requesting, but Saddam did not have time to argue, 
because he was due in Algiers to meet with Iranian diplomats to negotiate a settlement. After a 
two-day conference among Saddam, the Iranian Shah, and Algerian president Houari 
Boumedienne, Iran and Iraq agreed to end the conflict. Iran would withdraw support for the 
Kurdish rebellion and Iraq would concede its claim on the totality of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, 
and new borders would be drawn up over the next few months.  41
Thus, by 1975 the self-declared leader of the Arab world had been forced to make 
concessions to rebels in his own country, had been forced to beg for arms from his primary 
supplier, and had been forced to concede to his chief rival state portions of his own land. 
Saddam’s apparent nadir, however, did have a silver lining. Without the constant Iranian support 
and with French weapons from past deals beginning to trickle into Iraq, the Peshmerga collapsed 
within weeks.  Although Saddam had been forced to concede territory to Iran, the exchange was 42
not to begin until June of 1976. Then transfer was delayed for over a year; diplomats did not 
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meet in Tehran to begin negotiations in earnest until May 1978. When the Iraqi delegation 
arrived in Tehran, however, they surprised the Iranians by asking to change the location of 
twenty-one border markers and then left Iran without completing the negotiations. Iranian 
attempts to reestablish the commission both under the Pahlavi government and, after the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979, by the Islamic Republic were met with silence from Iraq for another year, 
until September of 1980, when Iraq declared war on Iran by issuing a note to the charge 
d’affaires of the Iranian Embassy saying, “the Iraqi armed forces are obliged to suppress the 
aggression of Iran on Zayn al-Qaws and Hose-Meimak.”  43
A lot had changed by the time Iraq declared war, enough for Iraq to go from a country 
bowing to Kurdish rebels because of a lack of military preparedness to a country apparently 
eager for war with a country several times its size in geographic area and population and armed 
with the latest in western military technology. Despite the humiliations Iraq had been through, 
Saddam’s armament program was alive and well. Iraq’s under-industrialized state and reliance 
on the Soviet Union during Saddam’s rise to power and initial war against the Kurds had a 
profound impact on him. These experiences were the inciting action for his plan to develop 
Iraq’s military industry and throw off the yoke of Soviet dominance and turn Iraq into a truly 
independent actor on the world stage. 
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Level Two: 
As the industrial and technical base matures, the LDC assumes greater responsibility for 
upkeep, maintenance, and repair of weapons, decreasing reliance on advisors and 
instructors.  44
 
Neither #5210-005 nor the hundreds of other T-55s also on the train were 
destined yet for service in the Middle East. Instead, they began their service to the Motherland as 
training platforms for young conscript tankists and ended the first leg of their journey over seven 
hundred kilometers into Soviet Russia at a massive training base in Naro-Fominsk, near 
Moscow. Their use was to support the education of the tankists on the operating principles of the 
T-55A. Soviet tank doctrine assumed that most tanks would have a short lifespan during an 
actual war. Therefore their tanks were designed, at the expense of durability, to be cheap and 
easy to build and repair. As #5210-005 served more and more conscripts it was sent more and 
more often to the on-base maintenance facility where ad-hoc repairs kept it in service. 
However, by 1974, after several years of difficult service, and as Saddam was abrogating 
his agreement with the Kurds, more substantial work was necessary and #5210-005 was sent for 
repairs at the Remzavod-7 plant in Kiev. There, the turret hatch was fitted with a new cupola 
ring to accommodate a 12.7mm DShKM machine gun and with a laser rangefinder to improve 
the main cannon’s accuracy. Due to older ad-hoc repairs and the new retrofits, #5210-005 was 
now quite unique in the details of which pieces of equipment were fitted and where, an issue it 
shared with many T-55A tanks at the time due to the extremely rapid pace of design tweaks and 
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subsequent changes in production series which were all technically in the same alphanumeric 
designation.  45
Newly repaired and refurbished, #5210-005 returned to its training mission only to 
quickly find itself seemingly abandoned in a vast field somewhere nameless in the Russian 
hinterlands. 
* * * 
Throughout the turmoil of the 1970s, Saddam’s program had facilitated substantial 
growth of the Iraqi military industrial complex. Iraq’s unique security situation forced a 
particularly pragmatic style of development largely underestimated by Western experts.  46
Saddam rightly believed that Iraq lacked the educational foundation to reach the level of 
industrial and technological development he wished. As he explained to Arab journalists in 1974, 
“We must therefore cooperate and deal with States and companies who implement for us, here in 
Iraq, projects that our experience and capabilities cannot handle in their entirety or which are 
beyond our technical capabilities.  Thus as the decade passed, Saddam focused not only on 47
straightforward purchases from a broad base of suppliers but also on training to enable domestic 
service and production. Oil cash that flowed in after the 1973 OPEC oil embargo dramatically 
raised prices gave Saddam the impetus to implement his plan in earnest.  
In 1974, Iraq began the first domestic production of arms on a highly limited scale when 
the Soviet Union began delivering turnkey powder and propellant factories.  Despite these 48
deliveries and the fact that deals made with the Soviet KGB gave the Iraqi intelligence services a 
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leg-up over the Kurds, Iraq had been burned by the Soviets too many times. Determined to end 
Iraqi reliance on the fickle Soviets, Saddam looked to strengthen ties with France.  In March of 49
1975, French experts from Avions Marcel Dassault-Bréguet Aviation, the manufacture of the 
coveted Mirage fighter jet; Snecma, the manufacturer of the Mirage’s jet engine; and the 
Government export agency Office Générale de l’Aire arrived in Baghdad and joined with 
diplomats from the French embassy. The French government had become a sales team.  The 50
French team told the Iraqis they could indeed sell them the Mirage jet that the Israelis had 
famously used in 1973 and, in fact, could do better. Dassault had recently released a newer, 
better fighter jet called the Mirage F1 that was categorically superior to the Mirage 3 that the 
Israelis had. More importantly than the jets, however, was the technology and skills to maintain 
and repair the French weapons.  51
Meanwhile Saddam visited Chirac in 1975 to request immediate aid in his losing war 
with the Kurds. Chirac refused the immediate request but did agree to future sales, and Saddam 
was able to make inroads on a more secret ambition. On a tour through Provence, he visited the 
Cadarache nuclear research center, home of the Rapsodie fast-breeder reactor, designed to create 
the plutonium needed for nuclear weapons.  When Saddam approached the Soviets about 52
expanding the research-reactor aid program first begun in the 1960s, they rejected his requests. 
Chirac, however, was happy to oblige even the most extreme of Saddam’s ambitions, as long as 
he could pay for it in cash.   53
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By the end of Saddam’s visit to France he still had no help for his immediate problem 
with the Kurds but he had negotiated billions of dollars worth of future weapons and other 
contracts. The list of new contracts was expansive: 
Petrochemical plants, desalination plants, gas liquefaction complexes, housing projects, 
telecommunications systems, broadcasting networks, fertilizer plants, defense electronics 
factories, car assembly plants, a new airport, a subway system, and a navy yard, not to 
mention Exocet, Milan, HOT, Magic, Martel, and Armat missiles; Alouette III, Gazelle, 
and Super-Puma helicopters; AMX 30-GCT howitzers; Tiger-G radar, and a nuclear 
reactor capable of making the bomb.  54
France agreed to help construct a reactor complex in western Iraq called Tammuz I/II and agreed 
to train Iraqis in the maintenance, repair, and manufacture of many of the weapons they would be 
receiving.   55
Saddam turned to other states as well besides France. By 1976, Iraq was buying from just 
about everybody. Companies from around the world from Brazil to West Germany competed for 
contracts to build railways, schools, chemical plants, electrical infrastructure, and more.  The 56
flow of experts into Iraq increased exponentially. In addition, other developing countries were 
beginning to offer arms on the international market, often at far lower prices than superpower 
competitors. Yugoslavia, Egypt, China, and Brazil soon began receiving Iraqi oil and cash in 
exchange for weapons. Brazil in particular was vital in developing Iraq’s military industrial 
complex, as well as Iraq’s ambitious unconventional weapons program. The Brazilian 
manufacturing company Engesa was the first to begin selling weapons to Iraq when, in 1976, 
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they sold 150 Cascavel armored cars, 150 Urutu Scout Cars, and 2000 other trucks as part of an 
$836 million deal. Brazilian scientists and engineers became ubiquitous in Iraq.   57
As billions of dollars of Iraqi money began flowing into France, Brazil, and elsewhere, 
the Soviet Union quickly realized that not only was Saddam no longer beholden to Soviet 
interests but also that the Soviet Union was losing the opportunity to get Iraqi cash. Thus, in 
1976, Soviet envoys in Baghdad signed a multi-billion dollar deal for the MiG-23 fighter jet, the 
most modern the Soviets had to offer, as well as missiles, artillery, tanks, and, most importantly, 
the training of Iraqi pilots and mechanics. The deal made it clear that Iraq’s former dependence 
on the Soviets was long gone.   58
In June 1977, Iraq and France finalized the Mirage fighter jet sale, which had been 
delayed by the French air force’s reluctance to relinquish the technology to its latest electronics 
and radar systems. Iraq had held firm, however, and France eventually agreed to sell a multirole 
version of the Mirage F1, capable of performing both air superiority and ground attack roles. Iraq 
bought thirty-six aircraft for $1.8 billion. Also included in the deal were 110 AMX-10P light 
tanks, Milan and HOT anti-tank guided missiles, and fourteen Super Frelon helicopters designed 
to launch Exocet anti-ship missiles. Most infuriating to the Soviets, however, was that France 
also agreed not only to maintain and repair former Soviet equipment but also to train Iraqis to do 
it themselves.  59
These developments allowed Iraq to take the upper hand with the Soviets. In 1978, they 
signed a $3 billion arms deal, the largest in Iraqi history, for 138 MiG-23 fighters, SCUD-B 
ballistic missiles, Il-76 transport planes, Mi-8 transport helicopters, SA-7 anti-aircraft missile 
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systems, MiG-25 reconnaissance jets/interceptors, and more. As a sign of how the tables had 
turned against the Soviets, in April of 1978, Saddam ordered the Soviets to move their embassy 
because he believed they were using its close proximity to the Presidential Palace to spy on him. 
The Soviets refused, and Saddam cut off their water and electricity, forcing the move within 
days.  Despite this substantial arms deal, by 1979, the Soviet share of Iraqi arms purchases had 60
dropped from 95 percent at the beginning of the decade down to 63 percent at the end.  61
Then in January of 1980, Iraq negotiated to purchase ship engines from the American 
General Electric company, a $11.2 million deal, and the first with the United States. The U.S. 
Senate blocked the deal, citing Iraq’s status as a supporter of international terrorism. The State 
Department under orders from President Jimmy Carter overruled the Senate’s decision and the 
deal went through, along with sale of several Boeing airliners.  By opening commercial 62
purchase deals with the Americans, Saddam was one step closer to getting the American 
weapons that he believed Israel had beaten the Arabs with in 1973. 
In 1979, Iraq declared at the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology in 
Vienna that it  would establish an arms industry capable of full self-reliance and security for 
“both Iraq and the Arab World” by the year 2000.  In 1980, Iraq had a population of about 63
twelve and a half million, with an army over twice as large as it had been in 1970, and with 
190,000 in active service and 250,000 in reserves, Iraq seemed well on its way to this goal.  64
Over the course of a decade, Iraqi defense expenditures increased from $734 million in 1972 to 
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$5.1 billion in 1979.  Iraqi arms vendors came to include Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia, East 65
Germany, West Germany, Egypt, France, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Italy, Jordan, Libya, 
Poland, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, and finally the United States. And by 1980, though most 
of Iraq’s equipment, such as the T-54/55 tanks and MiG-21s, was older Soviet equipment from 
the 1950s and 1960s, millions of dollars of new equipment was in place or on order. 
As Iraq maintained its silence while Iran demanded that it return to negotiations to 
finalize the humiliating treaty signed in 1976, Iraq could count in its army 1700 Soviet-made 
T-54/55/62 main battle tanks, 100 Soviet-made PT76 light tanks, 200 Soviet BMP armored 
personnel carriers, 1500 other armored fighting vehicles primarily of Soviet make, with a few 
Brazilian designs. 800 artillery pieces waited behind the lines. Advanced French HOT and Milan 
anti-tank guided missiles were slowly trickling into Iraqi army arsenals. A hundred French 
AMX-30 tanks were on order, and a further two hundred Brazilian Cascavels were being 
delivered. 
In the air, twelve Soviet Tu-22 jet bombers joined eighty Soviet MiG-23 fighters, sixty 
Soviet Su-7 fighters, thirty Su-20 fighter-bombers, 20 British Hawker FB59/FR10 Hunter jet 
fighters, and 115 Soviet MiG-21 interceptors. Thirty-two Mirage F-1C fighters and four F-1B 
trainers were being delivered by the French.  Thus though only a few of the new advanced 66
systems from France or the USSR had begun to arrive, such as the Milan missiles and MiG-23 
fighters, there was enough of the older equipment to cause a serious threat. 
In addition, Iraq had nineteen state-run ordnance factories that produced RPG-7 anti-tank 
launchers, hand grenades, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, Type 951 7.65mm pistols and 
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Type 70 9mm pistols, Yugoslav-designed Kalashnikov small arms, al-Qadisiyya 7.62x54mm 
sharpshooter rifle based on the Soviet SVD Dragunov rifle, 250 and 500kg aircraft bombs, 
ammunition for 7.62x39mm small arms, 12.7mm and 14.5mm heavy machine guns, 23mm and 
30mm cannons, cluster bombs, fuel air bombs, and several varieties of naval mines.  While none 67
of these weapons systems were particularly complex or advanced, they form the backbone by 
which any military fights. 
Nevertheless, with all of this increased firepower and industrial expansion, a declaration 
of war against Iran was still a declaration of war against a much larger country with a population 
of about forty million people and with vast quantities of western arms. Under the Shah, Iran had 
been one of America’s best customers , and America had arguably the best weapons money 
could buy. The Islamic Revolution of 1979, however, appeared to have radically changed Iran’s 
military situation. In fact, due to its close relationship with the United States, the Iranian Armed 
Forces were targeted perhaps more than any other organization. Equipment was sabotaged, 
twelve thousand army officers were purged, and dozens were executed.  In addition, although in 68
1980 the Iranian military had about 415,000 members, some observers at the time estimated that 
up to sixty percent of the force deserted during and after the Revolution.  69
Nevertheless, forty percent of 415,000 was almost equal to Iraq’s 190,000, and the 
equipment Iran still had was superior to Iraq’s. The army fielded 875 British Chieftain main 
battle tanks, 400 American M47/48 Patton tanks, 460 American M60A1 tanks, 250 British 
Scorpion light tanks, 325 American M113 Armored personnel carriers, 500 Soviet 
BTR-40/50/60/152 armored vehicles, 710 artillery pieces (including fourteen M110 203mm self 
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propelled guns, seventy two Soviet BM-21 mobile rocket artillery launchers), American 
BGM-71 TOW anti-tank guided missiles, 90 American CH-47 transport helicopters, and 205 
American AH-1J attack helicopters. In the Iranian Air Force, 190 American F-4D jet fighters 
joined 166 American F-5E/F jet fighters, 77 American F-14A jet interceptors, 14 American 
RF-14E reconnaissance jets, and American Phoenix, Sidewinder and Sparrow air-to-air missiles.
 The Chieftain tanks were top of the line, and the M60 Patton tanks had proved their worth in 70
the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The F-4 and F-14 were jets most countries could not even dream of 
acquiring. The F-4 had been effective in American hands in the Vietnam War, and the F-14 was 
perhaps the most advanced combat aircraft in the world at the time, and Iran was the only 
non-American customer to have the privilege to be allowed to purchase it.Plus, the Phoenix 
missile used by the F-14 had an extremely long range, making it a serious threat to anything the 
Iraqis had in their air fleet. 
But this huge force, armed with the most modern equipment money could buy and 
trained by Americans, had been overthrown by the Islamic Revolution.Iraqi General Ra’ad 
Hamdani mused: 
We heard of the revolutionary changes inside Iran that largely wrecked the Iranian army. 
That is, the Iranian army collapsed with the Shah’s regime, and a popular revolutionary 
army started to emerge as its replacement. This appeared as a dark cloud. How could this 
strong, well-equipped well-trained army just fall away with the regime to be replaced by 
just farmers and religious folk. We could not believe that the Shah’s army, with its 
American style and support, was not actually able to protect the Shah’s government . . . 
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the Shah’s army, built over long years, collapsed like an avalanche. Nobody expected 
this.  71
Saddam may not have expected the collapse of the Iranian military, but when it happened, he 
viewed it as an opportunity. The humiliating concessions of the 1975 Algiers Accord weighed 
heavily on his mind, and the Islamic Republic’s rhetoric around “exporting the Revolution” to 
Iraq pressured the Iraqi government to take action to prevent unrest within Iraq’s own majority 
Shia population. Indeed, several young officers within the Iraqi military, members of the 
Shia-dominated Dawa party, were swept up in the ideological furor of the Iranian Revolution and 
acted, perhaps under supervision from Iranian intelligence agents, to sabotage Iraqi army 
vehicles in preparation for a Shia uprising.   72
Thus, Iraq - no longer bound by Soviet restraint, armed by most of the world, and ready 
not only to manufacture its military’s basic needs but also increasingly responsible for the 
upkeep, maintenance, and repair of their equipment - declared war. Iraqi army leadership quickly 
put together a war plan. Iraqi forces would advance a short ways into Iran - 10 or 20 kilometers - 
forcing Iran to counter with their Revolutionary Militia forces stationed around distant Tehran, as 
the Army was presumed irrelevant. This would leave Tehran exposed, allowing for a 
counter-revolution under Iraqi guidance to take power. In the ensuing chaos, Iraq could seize 
Khuzestan and its rich oil fields. According to General Hamdani, “No one has ever planned for a 
long war - this is a situation that humankind has repeated throughout time. Everyone thinks a 
certain action will happen and refuses to expect the war to be long. Just as in World War I, 
World War II, or any war.” The war was expected to last no more than eight weeks.  Thus, after 73
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ten years of arms build-up, growing tension, and hostile rhetoric, Iraq invaded Iran on September 
22, 1980. 
 
Level Three: 
After extensive familiarization with the new technologies, states move to local assembly of 
foreign weapons from imported components.  74
 
#5210-005 was not alone in the Russian hinterlands. Alongside it stood thousands of old 
T-44, T-54, and T-55 tanks, all of them casualties not of war but of the Soviet Army’s large-scale 
transition to more modern T-62, T-64, and T-72 tanks. The T-62 had begun to supersede the 
T-55 even as #5210-005 was produced. Since then Morozov and other tank designers had 
improved and strengthened the Soviet Union’s armor forces even more. The T-72 was now 
superseding the T-62. The T-72 was a marvel of engineering, featuring far stronger steel and 
ceramic composite laminate armor, a larger and more accurate 125mm D-81/2A46 gun with an 
autoloader system, which removed the need for a fourth crewmember to load the gun, and higher 
top speed, and all in a package that was not significantly heavier than the T-62.  75
Even with its unique refurbishing, #5210-005 simply could not match the capabilities of 
the new T-72. The older tank sat dormant, collecting dust and snow, for nearly ten years. 
* * * 
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In addition to all its other new weapons, the T-72 was also now in Iraq’s arsenal. In 1979, 
Iraq had begun receiving small shipments of the most advanced tank in the Soviet arsenal, the 
T-72 main battle tank, which featured substantially thicker armor than either the T-55 or T-62 as 
well as the extremely powerful 125mm D-81T/2A46 cannon. This cannon had been developed 
after an Iranian army officer defected to the USSR in 1969 by driving his American-made 
M60A1 tank across the border. Soviet tank designers felt the M60A1’s 105mm gun was superior 
to the T-62’s 115mm D68 gun and as a result developed the 125mm D-81T/2A46 cannon to 
counter it.  The delivery of these tanks ended, however, when Iraq’s war with Iran began 76
because the Soviet Union again embargoed arms sales to Iraq - this time because of their fear of 
creating an incentive for the US to seek rapprochement with Iran and because of the uncertainty 
associated with a militant Islamist country bordering the predominantly Muslim Soviet Central 
Asian Republics and Afghanistan, where the Soviets were militarily involved.  Delivery of spare 77
parts ceased and the technicians left, taking their manuals and equipment with them.  78
Because of the success of Saddam’s program, however, the new Soviet embargo on arms 
sales and deliveries, unlike either of the previous two, had little ill effect on Iraq as the 
diversification and local production efforts had begun to make a significant impact on the ability 
of Iraqi forces to support themselves logistically. By the beginning of the war, Iraq was able to 
manufacture ammunition and spare parts for most of their Soviet equipment and, when they were 
unable to do so, the Iraqis often bought from other Arab states such as Egypt, Libya, and Jordan, 
who were less able than the Soviets to leverage arms sales into political favors. Assembly and 
maintenance sites for Iraq’s still largely Soviet-made arsenal sprung up at al-Ameen, Yusufiyah, 
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Huteen, Taji, Samawa, and elsewhere in Iraq.  Nevertheless, the Iraqis still struggled during the 79
invasion due to poor organization and training. 
These leadership and organizational issues appeared in the initial invasion, spearheaded 
by Iraqi tank units. The opposing forces had a certain degree of technological parity; Iraqi 
armored forces primarily fielded Soviet-made T-55 and T-62 tanks against Iranian M47, M48, 
and M60A1 tanks of American design and Chieftain tanks from the United Kingdom. The Iraqis 
had the advantage in numbers and consistency (the more varieties fielded by an army, the lower 
the ability to exchange spare parts between them) as well as perhaps the advantage in having 
slightly more powerful guns in the T-62 than most of what the Iranians had. These early days of 
the war saw perhaps the most intense tank-on-tank combat in the entire war, with the Iraqi 3rd 
Armored division, equipped with T-62s, crossing into Khuzestan and engaging with the Iranian 
92nd Armored Division, equipped with Chieftains. Despite the Iraqi numerical advantage, 
however, the Iraqis did not immediately achieve the victory they expected. As with Egypt and 
Syria in 1973, the Iraqi armor unit’s failure to achieve decisive victory despite their advantages 
was largely due to a deficit in effective training and gunnery experience. While Iraqi losses were 
not quite so lopsided as the Arab losses had been seven years prior, nonetheless Iraqi advances 
into Khuzestan were far less swift and decisive than the generals in Baghdad and Saddam had 
hoped.   80
Moreover, the troops and officers on the front lines were confused by disorganized 
leadership. Orders from headquarters were unclear or contradictory, commanders did not know 
what their objectives were, and little or no intelligence was provided to the troops. General 
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Hamdani, a reconnaissance battalion commander in the II Corps at the time, describes a 
breakdown between the high level divisional officers and the troops in the thick of the fighting. 
The problem was that most of the division commanders at the time were not competent 
commanders. We [the professional soldiers] looked at things differently because [the 
political generals] came into those commanding positions due to their loyalty to the 
[Ba’ath] party . . . My division commander was one of the worst division commanders, 
since he was one of these [Ba’ath] appointees. He did not fully understand his role and 
how to protect his sector, in this case regarding the sector for our paratroopers airdrop. 
Because of his incompetence, I had to carry out his [responsibilities] in addition to all of 
my tasks.  81
According to General Hamdani, Saddam’s paranoia and subsequent reliance on political 
leadership over the military would prove a serious and continuing problem for the Iraqi forces. 
This failure in planning also appeared early in the war in Iraq’s underestimation of the 
opposition it encountered during the battle of Khorramshahr, a major city directly on the border 
between the two countries, and the centerpiece of Iraq’s plan to seize Khuzestan. The Iraqi 
strategy involved reliance on their special forces units, elite troops who had been trained in 
Egypt, Turkey, or the Soviet Union. In contrast, Khorramshahr was defended by poorly armed 
militias. The brutality of the initial fighting wore down Iraq’s special forces units into irrelevance 
due to the enormous casualties sustained. Moreover, the Iranian’s tenacity in defense allowed 
large numbers of reinforcements to begin entering the combat zone particularly as the regular 
Iranian army was increasingly supplanted by the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic 
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Revolution, or Revolutionary Guards.   In the face of this unexpected resistance to what was 82
originally a surprise attack, Iraq took over a month to capture Khorramshahr and by the 
beginning of 1981 its ground forces had still not reached the critical Zagros Mountain passes 
necessary to create a handful of narrow choke points which Iraqi troops could easily block to 
prevent further Iranian troops from reinforcing Khuzestan.  83
The Zagros Mountains, which largely form Iraq’s eastern border with Iran, also formed a 
barrier for Iraq’s air force, which attempted a surprise air strike to cripple Iran’s air force in one 
fell swoop, a strategy emulating Israel’s highly successful opening blow in the 1967 war. Iraq 
had not yet begun receiving large quantities of the French Mirage fighter jets and so was relying 
on its older Soviet MiG-21s and other aircraft to attempt to achieve supremacy in the air over 
Iran. The Iranian air force had superior aircraft and more of them, most notably the 
American-made F-14 jet fighter and the American F-4 multirole jet, but since the Revolution the 
air force’s ability to actually field their equipment was dubious at best. Due to the Air Force’s 
previous close ties with the Shah’s government, the Revolutionary government imprisoned or 
banned from flying many of the pilots who could effectively counter the Iraqi air force. 
Nonetheless, the Iranians were able to negate any advantage the Iraqis may have had largely 
through capitalizing on geography. Iraqi Soviet-made supersonic jet Tu-22 bombers had the 
range to cross the mountains and reach targets deep within Iran, but the escort fighter aircraft 
such as MiG-21s lacked similar range to follow them. Furthermore, Iraq was unable to 
effectively jam Iranian radar sites due to the Zagros Mountains as well as a deficit in the required 
technology. This forced Iraqi bomber aircraft to fly low through the mountain valleys to avoid 
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detection by radar, which in turn meant that the Iranian air defense units were able to quickly 
discover which paths through the valleys were viable and to set up their defenses accordingly, 
thus greatly reducing the efficacy of Iraqi air strikes within Iran at this crucial early phase of the 
war.  84
Meanwhile, Iraqi failures in training and planning became all too apparent in the realm of 
helicopter warfare. Helicopters had their usefulness in combat proven during the Portuguese 
Colonial Wars in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau and were made publicly famous 
during the American war in Vietnam. In one of the few well-planned and executed operations in 
the early days of the war, in October of 1980 the Iraqis used all of their available helicopters and 
were successful. This was the exception, however, as during the early war Iraqi air defense 
operators were too poorly trained to be able to distinguish between Iraqi and Iranian aircraft and 
as a result often used their Soviet-made SA-7 MANPADS missile launchers (man-portable 
air-defense system) to shoot down Iraqi helicopters and other aircraft, mistaking them for Iranian 
aircraft. To prevent these friendly-fire incidents, the Iraqi leadership quickly instituted a policy 
that when Iraqi aircraft were being used, all air defense systems in that area of operations were to 
be shut down. Predictably, this allowed Iranian aircraft free reign during those periods in which 
Iraqi anti-aircraft systems could not respond to their incursions over Iraqi lines. General 
Hamdani recalls this rather disastrous policy: 
I remember an incident in the middle of one battle, when I was up on top of a hill and 
saw two Iranian Cobras [American-made attack helicopters sold to the Shah’s air force] 
coming from behind our forces and firing at ground targets. They were flying so low that 
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I could actually see the pilot and his long beard. I gave orders for the ground forces to 
respond, but they replied they had orders to do nothing, because everything was shut 
down, so that they could not use their anti air [sic] capabilities.  85
It was now abundantly clear that the war was not going to last a quick eight weeks. As the war 
dragged on it evolved into attritional warfare and strategic stalemate. Unexpected failures within 
the Iraqi forces and a surprising amount of skill and tenacity on the part of the Iranian defenders 
compounded to make the war a grueling and costly affair. 
The fighting wore down both sides quickly, but the Iranians were better able to capitalize 
on the equipment they had available. In late 1981 and early 1982, the Iranians launched a 
well-executed counteroffensive that put their limited armor capabilities to expert use, destroying 
up to seven hundred Iraqi tanks with comparatively light losses on the Iranian side and forcing 
most Iraqi troops out of Iranian territory.  Nonetheless, it was not all failure on Iraq’s side, as 86
their coterie of arms providers were providing enough aid to prevent total disaster. 
As tank losses mounted on both sides, the Iraqi arms procurement program looked to 
Warsaw Pact states and China to provide replacements. Unfortunately for Iraq, Iran did the same. 
While the Soviets had paused deliveries of the T-72 to Iraq, several other Warsaw Pact states 
produced versions of it and began shipping them to Iraq. Poland, for example, began deliveries to 
Iraq with a shipment of two hundred and fifty T-72M tanks in 1982. Iran, meanwhile, also 
obtained many T-72s, either captured from Iraqi forces or delivered by Libya, who seemed quite 
willing to sell arms to both parties of the war.  87
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China also sold to both sides. The Chinese had obtained licensed production of several 
models of early Cold War Soviet tank models, most notably the T-54 and T-55, which by the 
1980s were largely relegated to reserve and auxiliary units in Soviet service but had quickly 
become the tank of choice for Soviet and Chinese proxies in conflicts from Nicaragua to Angola 
to Vietnam. The Chinese made only slight modifications to the T-54 and T-55 models they 
produced (including an engine fan borrowed from the T-62, an example of which they had 
captured in 1969 during a border skirmish with the Soviets in far northeastern China along the 
Ussuri River) and designated their initial T-55 copy the Type 59 and their T-62-inspired version 
the Type 69. Both versions retained the obsolete 100mm gun of the original T-55, despite being 
outclassed by the 115mm smoothbore gun of the T-62 or the 105mm L7 rifled cannon used by 
most NATO armies.  China was more than willing to sell their tanks to both Iraq and Iran, and 88
while Iraq was better positioned to receive the Chinese tanks as Iraq already had the logistical 
system in place to adequately field Soviet-designed tanks, Iran also bought large numbers of 
Chinese-built Type 59 and Type 69 tanks to fill positions formerly occupied by American M47, 
M48, M60 and British Chieftain tanks. During the war, China would export nearly two thousand 
tanks to Iraq and Iran.  Iraqi tank units often abandoned Chinese-made tanks if they were broken 89
down or damaged as it was cheaper to simply buy a new one than bring the damaged vehicle 
back for repair.  90
French military aid, which had also begun in small amounts in the mid-1970s, was now 
making its appearance and impact on the battlefield, albeit not on a large scale. While the Mirage 
jets had not yet become a relevant factor in the skies, French electronic warfare equipment 
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(ground surveillance radars, radio decryption technology, etc.) such as the RASIT ground 
surveillance radar system first delivered to Iraq in 1976, allowed Iraqi reconnaissance and 
intelligence units to detect Iranian troop movements and plans, letting Iraqi troops to prepare 
accordingly.  91
Another issue faced and overcome by the Iraqis was the question of manpower. Iran had 
a substantially larger population than Iraq, and as a result had an obvious advantage in what was 
becoming a very costly war of attrition. In response, Iraq developed the Popular Army, a reserve 
force that helped rapidly expand the size of the Iraqi military while still maintaining the economy 
as Iraqi factories and oil wells still needed workers. Soldiers in the Popular Army were only 
required to serve for two or three months at a time in duties behind the lines, at logistics depots, 
maintenance bases, and defensive lines. After they finished their short term of service, they could 
return to work in the civilian economy.  92
Despite the broad range of states providing arms and the improvements in the Iraqi 
logistical and organizational structure, the offensive into Khuzestan still ground to a halt. By the 
time Iraqi troops had almost entirely been pushed out of Iran in spring 1982, Iraqi troops were 
beginning to realize that there was no way they could win the war they thought they would be 
fighting. General Hamdani states: 
This was a fact of the war. Where could we go, if we wanted to advance to a certain 
depth in Iran? For example, let us say that as a division commander you wanted to go 
more than forty kilometers into Iranian territory, what would be the point? Going this far 
would not get you any closer to Tehran, because it would still be another eight hundred 
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kilometers to the Iranian capital. So this imposed a natural limit on the Iraqi offensives. 
We began to assume a more defensive position. We did not have the capability to push a 
division thirty- forty kilometers into Iran, and such an advance would not have put an end 
to the war. Our strategy had to become defensive because of the depth of their territory. 
Cities like Tehran and Isfahan were far too deep in their nation. We knew we no longer 
had the capability to advance.  93
As 1982 came to an end, the two sides seemed settled in for a long, drawn out war of 
attrition. Then Iranian troops took the offensive and attempted to push into Iraq with the 
intention of deposing Saddam Hussein and liberating the holy city of Karbala, the most 
important city to Shia Muslims, which account for over ninety percent of the Iranian population. 
This was an attractive goal for an Iranian government still fresh from its religiously inspired 
revolution. 
While geography had helped Iran in defense in the first two years of the war, with their 
assault on Iraqi territory the situation flipped in Iraq’s favor. When Iraqi troops had been the 
invaders, their armored divisions were hindered by the rough and mountainous terrain that 
constitutes almost the entirety of the border region within Iran. When Iranian troops went on the 
offensive into Iraq, however, they were required to leave the sanctuary provided by those same 
mountains and advance into the relatively flat, dry, open plains of southern and eastern Iraq. 
Where the Iranians had been able to effectively mobilize infantry in the mountains to neuter the 
Iraqi armored columns, in the plains of Iraq the Iraqi armor now had the advantage over the 
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infantry-reliant Iranians. General Hamdani describes Iranian strategy during the period of 
1982-1984: 
The Iranians started to mobilize, since we had taken up strategic defense positions. They 
began to pull troops from all their sectors and from the depths of their country and put 
them in the staging areas . . . They attacked from many directions and created a long, 
drawn-out frontal battle. Moreover, they had the flexibility to reinforce successful units. 
If one unit at this point along the border were to penetrate our defenses, they would 
funnel more people in and keep the momentum going in this direction . . . [However] 
Iranian infiltration was not deep, because it relied on infantry, and they were only 
infiltrating during the night. So they could not move more than ten kilometers at night. 
The result was limited infiltration . . . Approximately ninety percent of Iranian attacks 
were successful in the early stages, but the attacks invariably lost their momentum. They 
would seize control of an area, suffering serious losses, and then we would shell them 
extensively with our artillery and bomb them with air support. But they were very 
persistent. The Iranians later realized that they could not achieve success on open ground, 
so they began to concentrate on the areas that neutralized the movement of our armor and 
weakened the impact of our air forces and artillery, such as in water-flooded areas, 
marshes, and sand dunes . . . In 1984, the Iranians started to infiltrate the marsh areas [in 
Southern Iraq] and so our armored elements were not able to get at them because of the 
water and high vegetation.   94
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Iranian strategy was fully oriented around a war of attrition, assuming their manpower advantage 
would eventually overcome Iraq’s equipment and technological advantage. Mass infantry 
assaults by Iranian soldiers may have been extremely costly for the Iranians, but they were 
chipping away slowly but surely at Iraq’s defensive lines. The war devolved into brutal, close 
quarters massacres on both sides of the line.  
Because Saddam continued to work to increase his global contacts, however, the invasion 
by Iran proved to be a diplomatic advantage for Iraq. First, the Soviet Union again reversed its 
position and once more began selling arms to Iraq. The Soviets, while not particularly fond of 
Iraq, viewed Iran as a potential threat to their interests elsewhere in the Muslim world, 
particularly in Afghanistan. Fears of Iranian rapprochement with the United States were put to 
rest by the Iranian government's apparent conviction that Iraq was an American puppet state and 
that the Iraqi invasion was an American effort to undermine the Revolution. The Soviet Union 
also saw an opportunity to re-establish itself as a key actor in the Arab world.  By backing Iraq, it 
was eventually able to begin full diplomatic relations with Oman and the Emirates as well as to 
sell anti-air missiles to Kuwait.  While Moscow was warming relations with Baghdad, Saddam 95
was also looking westwards to Washington. In February and March of 1984, the Reagan 
administration opened full diplomatic relations with Iraq.  96
Diplomacy, however, was not Saddam’s primary goal. Developing Iraqi military strength 
was. To that end, Saddam undertook and continued two different avenues toward creating 
weapons on Iraqi soil designed to break the attritional gridlock into which the war had devolved - 
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developing the ability to produce and deploy chemical weapons and the ability to construct its 
own Iraqi long-range missiles. 
Despite the fact that Iraq had signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol written in the aftermath of 
mass chemical death in the First World War banning the use of chemical weapons in warfare, 
Saddam’s plan for military supremacy had always included the possibility of unconventional 
weapons technology.  His plan to get nuclear weapons was put on hold in 1981 when Israeli jets 97
bombed the reactor the French had been building in the Anbar desert, so chemical weapons were 
the logical next step, as they were far easier to develop in large scale for a relatively 
technologically undeveloped country like Iraq.  As early as the 1970s, Saddam’s main agents 98
had begun meeting with several West German chemical companies. With the help of West 
German company Thyssen Rheinstahl Technology, construction began slowly in 1981 on a 
pesticide plant in Suwaira, south of Baghdad, capable of producing nearly four thousand tons a 
year of phosphate chemical weapons precursor chemicals. While Thyssen Rheinstahl denies 
knowledge of the plants actual use, this claim is highly suspect. The layout of the plant did not fit 
a standard pesticide plant model, and it was too small to be particularly useful in its official 
capacity. The project was also given a disproportionate amount of security by the Army.  99
Meanwhile, Saddam’s procurement agents were negotiating with Karl Kolb GmbH, a West 
German chemical company. Karl Kolb’s salesmen in Iraq, Klaus Franzl and Helmut Maier, met 
frequently with Amir al-Sadi, Iraq’s main man on chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons 
procurement and began plans for a massive chemical weapons plant in Samarra, north of 
Baghdad. Officially, the plant would be for pesticides, but Franzl and Maier knew full well the 
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true purpose of the Samarra plant.  The massive facility covered nearly two hundred square 100
kilometers, was intentionally spread out to make targeting by Iranian bombers more difficult, and 
was riddled with hardened buildings and bunkers. The first production line opened in 1983, and 
by 1986 there were six lines producing mustard gas, sarin gas, and tabun gas.  101
The first large-scale use of these Iraq-made chemical weapons occurred in February of 
1984. In what Iranian planners called the “Khyber Operation,”  Iranian commandos had 102
managed to quietly sneak through the Howizeh marshes under cover of darkness onto Majnoon 
island, north of Basra,and overwhelm the small garrison. The next day tens of thousands of 
Iranian regular troops reinforced them. Iraqi tank-reliant counterattacks got bogged down in the 
soft, wet soil and became easy targets for the Iranians. The Iraqi troops were losing, badly. To 
break the Iranian lines, Iraqi generals authorized the use of chemical weapons, and Iraqi 
helicopters of French, Soviet, and German make joined with Soviet-made Su-7 attack jets to drop 
hundreds of canisters of gas produced by the plant at Samarra. The results were immediate and 
horrific. 
The Iranians, who wore no protective clothing, felt ill almost immediately. Within 
minutes they began vomiting a yellowish liquid, and their skin turned red. By the time 
medics reached the battlefield, some of the troops were already dead, their faces horribly 
blackened by the gas. Others had amber colored blisters all over their bodies and were 
having trouble breathing.  103
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Despite Iraq’s mass usage of chemical weapons across the front beginning on Majnoon Island, 
Iranian troops held on. Majnoon Island remained in Iranian hands. The chemical weapons, while 
they killed and maimed brutally, were more of a psychological weapon than practical. General 
Hamdani was not particularly fond of Iraq’s usage of them but not because they were illegal or 
brutal: 
We feared the effects of the chemical weapons on ourselves because of the wind. The 
problem we had was that when our soldiers wore their protective masks, it would also 
limit their combat effectiveness, and the masks were generally uncomfortable. In the case 
of the wind changing directions, it would strike us, and we had to continue fighting while 
wearing the protective masks.  104
These early Iraqi chemical weapons were not particularly sophisticated, producing perhaps only 
a twenty percent fatality rate (as in only twenty percent of those exposed to the gas died from its 
effects). Iranian government statistics claim that during the Khyber Operation, Iraq launched 
forty-seven chemical air attacks, resulting in thirty-four deaths and over two thousand injuries.  105
The problem lay in the mixture the Iraqis were using, a combination of “yellow rain, yperite, and 
Tabun.” These faults were quickly corrected, however, and by Iran’s spring 1985 Badr Operation 
the fatality rate was increased to roughly sixty percent with a new mixture of hydrogen cyanide, 
mustard gas, Sarin, and Tabun.  Saddam’s plan for military independence and supremacy 106107
appeared to be succeeding on the chemical warfare front. 
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Iraq also began making progress on another front - the construction of long-range 
ballistic missiles. From 1982 through the beginning of 1986, most countries, including Iraq, 
believed that the war had entered a perpetual stalemate and that nothing serious was set to 
change. The Soviet Union continued a small amount of aid to Iraq, commensurate with deals 
signed in the 1970s, and France and other countries were slowly but surely arming Iraqi army 
units and helping build up Iraqi research and production facilities. There was not very much 
urgency in their efforts, however, due to the perceived stalemate. As one Iranian scholar wrote: 
[T]he rest of the outside actors involved in the conflict [had] concluded that in spite of 
occasional eruptions, the Iran-Iraq war had reached a state of strategic stalemate . . . This 
complex regional conflict appeared to have acquired a life of its own, to be a “forgotten 
war,” as though it were a permanent though nondefinitive, component of regional 
politics.  108
As part of this strategic stalemate, Iraq undertook indiscriminate bombing strategies 
against Iranian civilian as well as military targets. Within days of the war’s beginning, Iraqi 
planes had bombed the city of Ahvaz, in the center of Khuzestan province, and Dezful, another 
city in Khuzestan, killing hundreds of civilians and wounding hundreds more. Iraqi missiles, 
rockets, and artillery joined with the aerial bombardment and by the end of 1985 over six 
thousand Iranian civilians had been killed and twenty-one thousand injured.  109
Iraqi bombardment of Iranian civilian targets, however, was severely limited by the 
relatively short range of Iraq’s Soviet-made SCUD and 9K52 Luna/9M21/FROG-7 missiles, 
which could not hit Tehran. In 1984 Lieutenant General Amir Rashid al-Ubeidi, head of Iraq’s 
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missile and aerospace procurement programs, turned to what would seem an unlikely partner: 
Argentina. As part of their nuclear program, the military junta in Argentina had been secretly 
developing a long-range ballistic missile program called Condor with the help of elements of the 
West German aerospace company Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB), Italian defense 
company Snia BpD, and French electronics company Sagem.  Saddam was unconcerned with 110
the fact that the program had undergone substantial scrutiny during and after the 1982 Falklands 
War between Argentina and the United Kingdom because he did not plan to actively purchase 
the Argentine missiles. Instead, he intended to help fund the research and development and then 
incorporate the technology developed into Iraq’s own missile programs. Iraq dealt with the 
program almost exclusively through Egyptian intermediaries.  After the Americans began a one 111
billion dollar a year food aid program to Iraq, Saddam felt he had the financial freedom to invest 
more heavily in the missile program and other research, development, and production programs 
of new weapons, reaching fourteen billion dollars a year by 1984.  Thus, in 1984, Iraq was able 112
to begin construction of the Saad-16 missile research and production facility outside of Mosul 
with the help of some thirty-eight West German and Austrian firms. Hundreds of European 
engineers moved in to facilities at the Saad-16 site, always followed by Iraqi security personnel.
 Iraq’s ability to construct its own missiles had taken a substantial leap forward. 113
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Level Four: 
Assembly, in time, leads to licensed production with increasing proportions of local content 
and decreasing reliance on imported components and parts.  114
 
In 1986, the field of almost abandoned tanks deep within Russia proved to be a goldmine 
when Iranian troops launched their wildly successful al-Fao offensive, routing Iraqi troops 
along that peninsula in southern Iraq. The alarmed Soviet Union ramped up its exports to Iraq. 
#5210-005 was loaded back on board a locomotive and taken to the Black Sea port of Odessa, 
placed aboard the merchant vessel ​Leninsky Komsomol, ​and shipped to the Red Sea port of 
Aqaba in Jordan, where it was placed on a flatbed truck, driven across the desert into Iraq, and 
inducted into the 1/12th Brigade of the 3rd Saladin Armored Division. 
At last, all of its design legacy was put to the test. #5210-005 first saw action in several 
small skirmishes near Majnoon Island against Iranian infantry units where it did not escape 
unscathed. An Iranian American-made anti-tank missile struck the turret. #5210-005 once again 
left the field for repair but this time it was transported to the Iraqi Taji tank repair facility just 
north of Baghdad. Iraqi engineers added a new turret lifted from a Chinese Type-69 tank and 
replaced the road wheels with more modern “starfish” models. The Iraqi engineers also 
substantially upgraded #5210-005 in general. They applied large bricks of laminate armor made 
from layers of steel and rubber to the front of the hull and turret and added a large storage box 
to the turret’s rear plus a night-vision scope to the gunner’s optics package. 
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The new Iraqi-engineered modifications to Morozov’s original design served #5210-005 
well. In April of 1988 it was transferred to the headquarters company of the 15th Mechanized 
Brigade of the 5th Mechanized Division, where it helped at last to drive Iranian units out of Iraqi 
territory while receiving virtually no damage save for a few scars from machine gun bullets.  115
* * * 
The static war of attrition was not really as static as many believed. The Iranian military 
had been developing and practicing new infiltration tactics in small scale offensives since 1982. 
As the military professionalized in the chaos following the Revolution and initial Iraqi invasion, 
the Iranians began putting together an offensive that would radically change the way the war was 
fought and would bring it to a dramatic final battle. In the early weeks of 1986, Iranian troops 
began assembling on the Iranian side of the Shatt al-Arab river, across from Iraq’s vital al-Fao 
peninsula, which controls Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf. The surprise attack which followed 
on February 11, 1986, not only routed the Iraqis from al-Fao but also reignited the development 
plan in three ways: continued purchases from outside sources, internal growth and restructuring 
of weapons needed for the continuation of the war, and the search for and development of 
weaponry that was uniquely Iraqi in conception, design, and production. 
Iraqi commanders expected an Iranian attack but were convinced that it would come near 
the center of the Iraqi defensive lines, east and north of Basra, in the III Corps sector. Their 
expectation was not surprising as Iranian signals intelligence units created a web of false radio 
signals suggesting exactly that. Moreover, most of Iran’s previous attacks had hit this sector, 
with the goal of encircling and capturing Basra, though all had eventually been stopped by 
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determined Iraqi resistance with high casualties to both sides. General Hamdani claims that 
field-level intelligence and reconnaissance units were aware that the offensive was instead 
coming in the southern VII Corps sector. Even if he is correct, Iraqi planning did not account for 
it and as a result, when the offensive, code named ​Amaliaat-e Valfajr 8 ​or Operation Dawn 8 by 
Iranian central command, did begin in the VII Corps sector in al-Fao, the Iraqis were unprepared.
 116
The Iraqi 26th Division stationed on al-Fao at the time had prepared some minor 
defensive lines but due to Iraq’s assumption that the attack would come elsewhere, the defenses 
were not sufficient. In contrast, Iran had built up a substantial local force superiority both in 
numbers and artillery firepower, using an entire Corps of several divisions. In the dark early 
hours of February 11, elite Iranian units crossed the Shatt al-Arab river on small boats and 
infiltrated the Iraqi defensive lines with substantial artillery fire support. Tens of thousands of 
Iranian regular army and Revolutionary Guards units followed them, quickly overwhelming the 
limited Iraqi defenses and routing the relatively small Iraqi garrison.  The offensive was 117
extremely well planned and executed, and it used every aspect of the Iranian military, including 
the navy, army, air force, and Revolutionary Guards. General Hamdani described the battle: 
[The Iranians] demonstrated a high-quality performance of integrated operations. There 
were thousands of boats that fit four hundred people, rushing in before dawn. These were 
rubber boats, wooden boats, and big boats all transporting thousands of soldiers in a few 
moments under the cover of intense artillery and air bombardment of the area. We 
downed some of the Iranian aircraft and the recovered pilots gave us information about 
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the attack. These were important since our leaders would not believe our reports without 
that evidence. One of the POWs was an air force captain, and he gave us the plan . . . and 
told us that there was at least a corps level force in the attack. This was when the strategic 
command back in headquarters finally began to pay attention.  118
The sudden and unexpected attack was devastating. The Iranian troops had completely routed the 
Iraqis and due to the terrain, the Iraqi troops were barely even able to retreat. A massacre 
followed, as Hamdani describes: 
The nature of the terrain in this area was so dusty in dry periods and muddy when raining, 
that it was always difficult to maneuver. We could only stay on the roads, and with all the 
traffic funneled along the only two roads, it was terrible- the infantry, the BMPs [a 
Soviet-made armored fighting vehicle], the armor. Because of the fact that there were 
only two roads, the Iranian forces were able to continuously shell both. They knew about 
the terrain conditions and that the roads were the only way in or out of transportation . . . 
there were many losses caused by the intense shelling . . . the land became barren. I had 
never seen such intense bombing throughout the war.  119
Only a tenacious and extremely costly defensive action by Iraqi Republican Guards, Iraq’s best 
units, was able to contain the Iranians to al-Fao. A hastily assembled Iraqi counterattack on 
al-Fao failed, and another attack to capture the Iranian town of Mehran in retaliation was initially 
successful but an Iranian counterattack pushed the Iraqis back and captured a significant amount 
of equipment and prisoners of war. In these battles, the question of technological parity never 
arose. The Iranians had simply successfully undertaken a complex, sophisticated, and highly 
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professional operation that proved their growing tactical and strategic abilities. Moreover, the 
capture of al-Fao meant that Iran now controlled almost all of Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf, 
put Iranian artillery within range of Kuwait, and threatened Iraq’s main naval base at Umm Qasr. 
Many other states observing the conflict began to doubt Iraq. Observers in Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, and elsewhere began to seriously believe that Iraq’s forces might soon begin to collapse 
across the entire front line under the Iranian onslaught.  To compound Iraq’s new troubles, the 120
army had lost vast amounts of equipment and ammunition in the battles around al-Fao and 
needed to replenish their stocks. Other states, however, became much more circumspect in their 
willingness to open lines of credit with Iraq. France in particular was especially harsh in its 
desire to have outstanding debts paid before signing new deals.  121
Once again Iraq’s longstanding, if often fraught, relationship with the Soviet Union came 
to its aid. In the aftermath of Iran’s victory in al-Fao, the Soviet Union massively increased 
shipments of weapons to Iraq. Between 1986 and 1988, the Soviets provided about nine billion 
dollars worth of arms and technology to Iraq, including “more than 2,000 tanks (including 800 
T-72s), 300 fighter aircraft, almost 300 surface-to-surface missiles (mostly SCUD-Bs), and 
thousands of pieces of heavy artillery and armored personnel vehicles.”  Thus, in the buildup to 122
Iraq’s eventual counteroffensive, Iraq had 4500 T-54/55/62/72 tanks of Soviet design and 1500 
T-59/69 tanks of Chinese make.  123
But Saddam knew well that purchases from the Soviet Union would not be enough. It 
was clear that in order to effectively retaliate against Iran, the Iraqi military industrial complex 
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needed expansion and reformation. Consequently, in January of 1987 Saddam handed control of 
the State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI), the branch of the Ministry of Defense 
responsible for arms production and a large amount of procurement, to Hussein Kamil, Saddam’s 
cousin and former bodyguard.   124
Under Kamil’s tenure at SOTI, the efficiency and capacity of Iraq’s military industry was 
greatly increased. The war allowed much bureaucratic red tape to be cut, and Kamil was an 
expert in going from conception to production in record time. Kamil is quoted as saying: 
[B]ecause of the war, all of us were in a hurry, and this allowed us to cut red tape. For 
instance, we performed no feasibility studies in the normal sense. Because we are all 
fighters we know the end-use of our weapons . . . Sometimes a simple telephone call 
between a military user and myself can get the process going . . . while some of us work 
on building a prototype, others begin designing production tools, etc. 
In 1988, SOTI was combined with the Ministry of Heavy Industry and the Military Production 
Authority to form the Ministry of Industrialization and Military Industrialization (MIMI) putting 
Kamil in charge of the entire Iraqi industrial apparatus.  125
Kamil’s restructuring of SOTI centered around two prongs, each intended to be half of 
the final blow planned against Iran. The first prong was the production of basic equipment such 
as tanks, ammunition, and spare parts, needed to replenish Iraq’s depleted stocks of equipment 
and ammunition. The success of this prong depended on Iraqi industry and Iraqi skills, two areas 
where the effects of Saddam’s investments in the rapid and total development of the relevant 
aspects of Iraq became clear. The Iraqi university system had been massively expanded and 
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structured around industry, and as a result saw a 300 percent increase in enrollment in technical 
fields, equalling over 120,000 students by the end of the 1980s.  The emphasis on purchasing 126
not just equipment but also technology and training resulted in the percentage of foreign 
specialists at SOTI/MIMI research and development centers dropping substantially, from around 
250 out of 3000 at the beginning of the war to just 20 out of 3000 by war’s end.  127
In addition, Iraqi domestic tank assembly and modification programs had recently been 
implemented by 1986 and 1987, and large scale modification and upgrade of armored vehicles, 
particularly T-54/55 and their Chinese Type 59/69 equivalents was underway, adding night 
vision sights, additional armor panels, and concealment smoke launchers. Iraq was also 
undertaking some limited local assembly of T-55 models as well as local production and 
assembly of the Soviet-designed BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle with Iraqi modifications in 
armor and gun. Both vehicles are staples of any armored assault.  The massive influx of 128129
weapons both from the Soviets and their own factories allowed the Iraqi army to double in size 
from twenty-six to fifty divisions from 1986 to 1988 and was accompanied by restructuring of 
command that massively helped tilt the balance of power against Iran.  130
The second prong in Kamil’s restructuring was the development of a long-range ballistic 
missile program intended to target cities deep within Iran such as Tehran and to destroy Iranian 
civilian morale. In December of 1986, the Soviet Union had shipped to Iraq as many as three 
hundred SCUD-B tactical ballistic missiles, which had a range of about three hundred 
kilometers, well short of the nine hundred kilometer distance to Tehran. To develop a method to 
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extend the range of these newly purchased missiles, Iraq signed a deal with Brazil, who was 
working with French aerospace companies to build missiles of their own. Iraq would ship several 
of the Soviet missiles to Brazil where they would be disassembled and reverse engineered by 
Iraqi, Brazilian, and French engineers. The team eventually concluded that by repurposing parts 
from some of the missiles, the range could be extended but at the cost of cutting by a third the 
size of Iraq’s SCUD-B fleet. In effect, three hundred short range missiles could be turned into 
two hundred long-range missiles.  Saddam dubbed the new modified missile the al-Hussein, 131
and tests showed it had double the range of the original SCUD-B produced by the Soviets.  132
Iraqi engineers were also able to further modify the SCUD-B to have a range of up to nine 
hundred kilometers and have even greater accuracy than the al-Hussein, called the Abbas 
missile.   133
Saddam felt, however, that not even local equipment manufacture or the redesign of 
weapons built by other states was sufficient. He had grander ambitions in mind, something to not 
just win the war but to bring prestige to Iraq. This ambition intersected with those of another 
eccentric and ambitious man who had been floating around the international arms industry for 
two decades, a Canadian engineer and ballistics expert named Gerald Bull. 
Bull was perhaps the quintessential eccentric genius, known for knocking down the walls 
of his advising professor’s office in order to make room for a wind tunnel for testing and for 
clashing with Canadian government officials who refused to give him funding.  He cut his teeth 
helping with the ultimately doomed Canadian Velvet Glove missile project in the 1950s, an 
attempt to establish an independent Canadian arms industry, and developed a fascination with the 
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idea of launching a satellite into space using an artillery cannon.  The concept had shown some 134
merit during testing with a modified U.S. Navy 400mm cannon in Barbados with funding from 
McGill University in Canada and the American military.  However, when the interest from the 135
military waned and subsequently their money dried up, Bull was left to drift. As a means of 
financing his dream supergun project he casually designed a 155mm artillery cannon, the GC-45, 
and an accompanying 155mm shell to fire from the gun. Bull’s new design put every other 
artillery system in the world to shame. It could accurately fire his shells up to thirty kilometers, a 
full ten kilometers more than standard 155mm guns used around the world.  Bull eventually 136
sold the technology for the GC-45 to the Austrian company Voest-Alpine, which produced the 
gun under the name of GHN-45. The gun made a significant impact, particularly through its use 
by the armed forces of Apartheid South Africa against Cuban and Soviet-aligned MPLA 
Angolan forces during the Angolan Civil War.  The technology eventually made its way to a 137
great many countries in some form. In fact, Voest-Alpine and the South Africans sold hundreds 
of GC-45s to both Iran and Iraq during the war.  The quality of the guns caught the attention of 138
Hussein Kamil’s SOTI, and in November of 1987 he called Gerald Bull’s offices in Brussels, 
Belgium.   139
In January of 1988, Bull and his sons, who acted as his business partners and associates, 
flew to Baghdad to meet Kamil. There, they discussed a partnership to develop an indigenous 
family of Iraqi artillery based around Bull’s designs and to provide assistance in further 
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developing Iraq’s industrial and engineering capabilities. Most interesting to Bull, however, was 
Kamil’s insistence on eventually putting Iraqi satellites in orbit. Bull jumped on the opportunity 
and brought up his supergun idea. Kamil, knowing of Saddam’s visions for a uniquely Iraqi 
prestige project, was excited about the prospect.  The supergun project was eventually allotted 140
twenty-five million dollars and dubbed Project 839 by Bull’s Space Research Corporation 
(SRC), and Project Babylon by the Iraqis.  SRC would also provide training and education for 141
Iraqi engineers.   142
Thus in the two years following its humiliation at al-Fao, Iraq worked to further develop 
its military capabilities in preparation for a counteroffensive planned for the spring of 1988. As 
Bull had only become involved in January of 1988, it is unknown whether any of his 
contributions used by Iraq later, particularly those in artillery, were ready for deployment in the 
spring. But the purchases from the Soviets, the equipment produced within Iraq, the weapons 
modified by Iraq, and the greatly expanded and restructured military were ready for a renewed 
counterattack against Iranian forces on the al-Fao peninsula and elsewhere. 
The counteroffensive began with the deployment of the modified SCUD-B missiles. For 
months in early 1988, from February 29 through May 1, three hundred missiles, mostly 
al-Hussein models, were launched at targets in Iran. One hundred and thirty-three hit Tehran, 
killing hundreds and causing a general panic in the city which caused thousands more to flee into 
the countryside.  143
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The Iraqi assault on Iranian civilian targets was accompanied by weeks of false 
intelligence and radio signals with which the Iraqis deceived the Iranians into believing the 
attack would come elsewhere, much like the Iranians had done back in 1986. The ruse worked, 
and the Iranians moved the seasoned fighters out of al-Fao to where they expected the attack to 
come and replaced them with raw recruits. Then in a daring, swift night assault, General Rashid 
of the Iraqi army drove an entire armored division into the unprepared Iranian front lines. His 
assault was accompanied by a powerful air bombardment, including a new nine-ton bomb, 
designed and built in Iraq, which was so powerful its enormous blast caused some captured 
Iranian soldiers to believe the Iraqis had used nuclear weapons. The Iraqis accompanied their 
armor and air assault with a massive chemical artillery bombardment on Iranian positions. 
Within hours of the start of the assault, Iranian morale was crippled, and al-Fao’s defenders 
routed.  General Hamdani recounts that Iraqi planners were surprised at the swiftness of their 144
impending victory. 
The reports started to come in, and we had not expected to liberate al-Fao this [quickly]. 
The Iranians were starting to drop and fall apart and were fleeing across the bridge back 
to their side. So Saddam asked . . . “What do you recommend? What is your opinion 
about how we can handle the situation? Is it better to strike the bridge now or later?” 
Then there was this suggestion to let them leave because of the psychological impact it 
would have. With low morale within the ranks of the Iranian forces, it would be hard for 
them to fight again.  145
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The strategy worked. Within a few short months, Iranian forces had been routed completely and 
Iraqi troops quickly pushed all Iranian forces out of Iraq and even seized several thousand square 
kilometers of Iranian territory before Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 
reluctantly signed a ceasefire agreement in July of 1988. The war ended officially on August 20, 
1988. Khuzestan remained in Iran, but Iraq had taken ​de facto ​control over the entirety of the 
Shatt al-Arab.  A bare minimum of half a million combined Iranians and Iraqis were dead.146 147
Saddam was famous for his often callous nature, and while the war had killed hundreds of 
thousands of Iraqis, it had been a perhaps necessary catalyst for a never-before-seen extremely 
rapid expansion and development of Iraq’s military industrial complex. 
 
Level Five: 
Technological assimilation through use and production, in theory, leads to eventual use of 
acquired infrastructure for local research and development (R&D), weapons design, and 
completely indigenous production.  148
 
Scarred but still battle ready, the T-55A tank #5210-005 no longer had a battle to fight 
now that Iraq was at peace. Still, the tank was useful. In late April of 1989, #5210-005 stood on 
display at the Baghdad Arms Exposition, where foreign arms experts marveled at the crude but 
effective modifications and repairs the Iraqi engineers had made and that had served #5210-005 
so well. 
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Two years later, Iraq invaded Kuwait and those modifications again stood #5210-005 in 
good stead. The 15th Mechanized Brigade was at the tip of Iraq’s spear into Kuwait. For one 
shining moment, during a surprise Iraqi assault on Saudi lines at the Saudi-Kuwaiti border town 
of Ras al-Khafji, #5210-005 was utterly victorious. The enemies of Iraq ran away and died by the 
dozen, Americans and Saudis both. The Iraqi tanks seemed invincible. Even when a MILAN 
anti-tank missile fired by Saudi troops struck #5210-005’s Iraqi-made laminate armor, it did no 
significant damage. Morozov would undoubtedly have been proud of the legacy of his design. 
* * * 
Neither the war with Iran nor the first crushing defeat at al-Fao ended Saddam’s dream. 
Instead, they enabled it to come true by serving not only as an impetus but also as a testing 
ground. As a result, with the signing of the treaty and the return to uneasy peace, Saddam had an 
almost fully developed military industrial complex, an arsenal of Iraqi modified or designed 
weapons, and an operative plan for developing a domestically produced fleet of aircraft. He 
showed off his successes just a few months before it all began to unravel. 
The military industrial complex now headed by Hussein Kamil was booming. It 
employed over a hundred thousand people and Iraq had perhaps the best educated workforce in 
the entire Arab world.  In spring 1989, just a few months after the end of the war, the first ​Asad 149
Babil​ (Lion of Babylon) tanks rolled off the assembly line in Iraq. The ​Asad Babil ​was an 
Iraqi-built licensed copy of the Soviet-designed T-72M1 main battle tank, which Iraq had bought 
by the hundreds from the Soviet Union, Poland, and elsewhere and used to great effect. Many of 
their T-72s were modified with a Chinese electro-optical dazzler active protection system similar 
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to the Russian-made ​Shtora ​system, designed to disrupt the flight path of incoming laser-guided 
anti-tank missiles.  Iraqi factories were also producing the 125mm 2A46/D81 self-loading gun, 150
the ammunition, the optics, the electronics, and additional minor parts while other parts were 
manufactured in the Soviet Union and sent to Iraq for final production and assembly. Iraqi MIMI 
officials declared that within a few years, the T-72 copy would have every part produced within 
Iraq.  151
In addition to its successes with producing and redesigning tanks, Iraq was making 
substantial progress on its missile and artillery system programs. In November of 1988, Iraq 
unveiled its ​Fao-1 ​anti-tactical ballistic missile, a missile designed, apparently locally, to shoot 
down ballistic missiles fired at Iraq. Iraqi engineers also worked on the ​Waleed, ​an offshoot of 
the Argentine Condor long-range ballistic missile program. With Gerald Bull’s help, Iraqi 
factories produced prototypes of the ​Majnoon ​155mm self-propelled howitzer, and began work 
on the 210mm ​Fao ​gun system capable of firing a two-hundred kilogram shell up to forty 
kilometers. Also being produced were the ​Ababil, Sajeel, ​and ​Nasr ​rocket artillery systems, a 
copy of the Soviet D-30 122mm howitzer, a locally designed 155mm howitzer dubbed the 
Saddam, ​and​ ​the locally designed ​Saqr ​infrared 500kg guided bomb. Then on December 7, 1989, 
Iraq test-launched the ​Tammuz ​rocket booster, capable of putting satellites in orbit or firing a 
guided missile up to three thousand kilometers.   152
To improve its air supremacy, Iraqi technicians modified French-made Mirage F1 jets to 
fire Soviet-made AS-14 Kedge guided missiles. Soviet-made IL-76 transport jets were modified 
into airborne early warning radar aircraft with a combination of French and British electronics 
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equipment and dubbed the ​Baghdad-1. ​The radar used in these aircraft, the French 
Thomson-CSF Tiger-G, was built under license in Iraq. Later versions of these aircraft were 
capable of not just early warning but also integrating with the radars of fighter jets and 
ground-based radar into a holistic system of command and control, a particularly impressive 
technical feat.  153
These advances with other states’ aircraft were useful but Saddam also coveted a 
domestically produced fleet of aircraft, and in June of 1989 began signing deals with European 
companies to work on what was dubbed the ​Fao ​project (as distinct from the ​Fao ​210mm 
artillery piece). The project was a multi-phase decade-long project. The deal was worth over 
three billion dollars and would involve purchasing the rights and technologies to partially 
assemble sixty Mirage 2000s, France’s most modern combat aircraft, as well as sixty Alphajet 
trainers. The deal also included a potential for an additional sixty aircraft of both types.  154
Thus, Iraq was well on its way to full local production of almost everything they wanted. 
They were not only modifying the equipment of other countries but also designing their own, and 
plans for domestically produced aircraft were underway. Accordingly, Saddam wanted to share 
his success with the world. 
Between April 28 and May 1 of 1989, Saddam hosted a massive arms exposition in 
Baghdad, which he called the First Baghdad International Exhibition for Military Production. 
Over a hundred companies from dozens of countries were in attendance.  The expo opened 155
with an incident of violence that highlighted the biting irony of its slogan - “Defense equipment 
for peace and prosperity” - and that seemed befitting of the just-ended war and the greedy 
153 Sayigh, pg. 116-120 
154 Sayigh, pg. 106 
155 CAAT, ​Arming Saddam 
61 
cynicism of the hundreds of foreign arms salesmen in attendance. An Alphajet aircraft to be 
displayed at the expo and flown by an Egyptian pilot attempted to land at the airport adjacent to 
the expo but miscalculated its flight path and strayed too close to the Presidential Palace. 
Anti-aircraft guns manned by the Republican Guard immediately shot it down, and though the 
pilot and copilot survived, the damaged jet crashed into a civilian neighborhood, killing dozens.
  156
Some of the Iraqi weapons on display were just empty shells. For example, Gerald Bull’s 
Fao ​210mm self-propelled howitzer was there - or at least, a model of it was there that looked 
very much like a working vehicle.   Others were crude amalgamations of the designs of 157
different countries. For example, a modification of the T-55 tank was on display, featuring a 
2A46/D-81 125mm self-loading gun which had been taken from a T-72 and fitted into an 
enlarged and heavily altered version of the T-55 turret, which is designed to fit the much smaller 
100mm D-10T gun. Though the ability of a tank designed for a 100mm gun to actually use a 
125mm gun is doubtful, at least in the design the Iraqis had, the modified tank was still proudly 
displayed.  Still other weapons seemed poorly manufactured. A French engineer in attendance 158
commented on the often roughshod production quality: 
They don’t lose any sleep over quality control, do they? And you know something? In the 
end, they’re right. We spend a fortune trying to smooth out those rough edges. We make 
three-star bombs, polished as a mirror and as expensive as jewels. But in the end, they’re 
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all the same. They only get used once, and the guy who’s on the receiving end of one of 
these is never going to complain because of a few manufacturing defects.  159
Despite these negatives, the fact remained that while some of the Iraqi weapons may have 
been paper tigers, Saddam had built up an impressive collection of weapons and industry. French 
Chief of Staff Maurice Schmidt was in attendance and was surprised at the amount of French 
technology on display in the Iraqi weapons. “[I] began to wonder whether we hadn’t gone a bit 
too far [with Iraq]. I realized we had better begin paying closer attention to what the Iraqis were 
developing.”  To have the world pay closer attention was exactly what Saddam wanted. With 160
the expo it seemed that Iraq was well on its way to total success. The Iraqi statement to the UN 
in 1979 that they would be fully self-sufficient by 2000 no longer appeared far fetched. 
While the mood among the Iraqi and European arms experts at the 1989 arms fair may 
have been jubilant, things soon began to go sour for Iraq. In March of 1990, Gerald Bull was 
shot to death outside his Brussels apartment, likely by Israeli agents afraid of his contributions to 
Iraq’s ballistic missile program. Bull’s death effectively put an end to Project Babylon and Space 
Research Corporation’s substantial assistance to Iraq’s artillery and engineering programs.  To 161
make matters worse, regional political and economic conflicts and rivalries were starting to come 
to a head. The Iran-Iraq war had caused a severe economic and political strain on much of the 
Middle East. While certain countries like Egypt and some of the Gulf states helped Iraq to 
varying degrees, Syria had aligned itself with Iran, largely because of an old and bitter rivalry 
between the ruling Ba’ath parties of Syria and Iraq. In 1989, Iraqi and Syrian proxy forces 
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clashed in Lebanon.  At the same time, the Israel-Palestine peace process was not going well, 162
and Iraq and Israel repeatedly exchanged threats though not gunfire. Then, in the two years 
following the war, Kuwait exceeded OPEC-mandated oil production which caused a sudden drop 
in oil prices and thus a severe drain on Iraqi revenue. Iraq viewed this action, perhaps rightly, as 
a direct threat to Iraq’s post-war recovery and development.  163
The loss of oil revenue was further complicated by Iraq’s war debt, perhaps as much as 
eighty billion dollars. Before the war, Iraq had been able to pay for its new military expansions 
in cash due to its substantial oil revenue. When Iran attacked into Iraq starting in 1982, however, 
much of Iraq’s oil production was interrupted or halted outright, causing a serious financial 
problem. As a result, much of Iraq’s development during the 1980s had been done on credit. 
With the war over, those debts hung over Saddam like a dark cloud.  Kuwait had been one of 164
the states that had loaned billions to Iraq, and once the war ended a combination of old border 
disputes, Kuwaiti refusal to submit to oil quotas, and Iraqi debt to Kuwait led Saddam to a 
dangerous thought: Invasion and occupation of Kuwait would solve all of these problems. A 
summit held in Baghdad in May of 1990 included Saddam, the Emir of Kuwait Sheikh Jaber 
al-Ahmad, and other Arab leaders in an attempt to reach a diplomatic solution to the increasing 
fear that Saddam would resort to war. With an almost fully developed military industrial 
machine and a vast army at his disposal, Saddam’s incentives to negotiate were low. The 
summit, not surprisingly, was a failure.  On the morning of August 2, 1990, a fully equipped 165
and well-supported Iraqi army invaded Kuwait.   166
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American President George H.W. Bush immediately began to assemble a coalition of 
allies, including several Arab states such as Saudi Arabia with the goal of getting Iraq to 
withdraw, through either diplomacy or military action.  Despite the strict economic sanctions 167
imposed on Iraq following its invasion, diplomacy did not seem to be working. In November 
1990, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 678 allowing the use of force to 
expel Iraqi military forces from Kuwait. Iraq was given one month to comply. In a desperate bid 
to gain Iranian support against the rapidly-assembling Coalition, Iraq relinquished its favorable 
position on the Shatt al-Arab river, gained at the end of the Iran-Iraq war.  Meanwhile, 168
Coalition forces, primarily consisting of American, British, and Saudi troops assembled along 
the Saudi border with Iraq and Kuwait.  Iraq refused to withdraw, so on January 16th 1991 169
Coalition air forces began launching massive air and missile strikes on Iraqi military and 
industrial targets within both Iraq and Kuwait, focusing on destroying the Iraqi Air Force and 
bombing the supply lines to Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Hundreds of aircraft took part in the 
bombing.  As his military and industry were decimated by the massive Coalition bombardment, 170
Saddam reached out to Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and UN officials to negotiate to end 
the war and withdraw from Kuwait on the condition that sanctions be lifted and American troops 
be withdrawn from Saudi Arabia. President Bush rejected the deal and on February 24 the 
Coalition land operation began. Iraqi troops, already greatly debilitated by weeks of air 
bombardment, fled immediately before the Coalition invasion. In one particularly grisly incident, 
thousands of fleeing Iraqi troops were massacred by American aircraft on Highway 80 in 
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Kuwait. The massacre was so wanton and unnecessary that Bush was pressured into ending the 
war on February 27, 1991, barely a month after Coalition forces had entered the conflict. Once 
more, tens of thousands more Iraqis were dead and all the gains Iraq had made during the 
Iran-Iraq war, from their massive military build up to gaining control over the Shatt al-Arab, 
were lost.  171
The attempted invasion of Kuwait ended Saddam’s dream of achieving total military 
independence by 2000. Not only had the bombing destroyed much equipment and many 
manufacturing locations but harsh embargoes had also been put in place that prevented all legal 
weapons sales to Iraq. But all was not lost. Though the Americans had predicted that they would 
wipe out Iraq’s military industry as soon as the air campaign began, only an estimated thirty 
percent of Iraq’s military industry was damaged or destroyed.  Much of the industrial 172
equipment had been relocated before the bombing campaign began and was hampered only by a 
lack of spare parts due to the embargoes and sanctions placed upon Iraq after the end of the war 
with Kuwait. Moreover, though many of Iraq’s most ambitious projects had been ended either 
directly by bombs or indirectly by sanctions, the basics of military necessity remained 
operational. Explosives factories, ammunition factories, and tank repair plants stayed functional. 
In fact, relying on the munitions that were still being produced by the remaining Iraqi military 
industry, Saddam’s army was able to undertake complex and successful counterinsurgency 
campaigns that swiftly and brutally suppressed the Kurdish rebels in the north and Shia rebels in 
the south who rose up against Saddam in the internal chaos that followed Iraq’s defeat in the 
1991 war.  Reduced to relying on the shreds of his program, Saddam managed to maintain his 173
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control of Iraq. For one brief shining moment before the 1991 war, however, he had stood poised 
on the cusp of the independence, global power, and prestige he had sought for more than twenty 
years. 
* * * 
CONCLUSION ​:​ As the war in Kuwait proceeded, however, the Iraqi troops were eventually 
defeated and routed. The 15th Mechanized Brigade and the crew of T-55A #5210-005 
abandoned the long-serving tank, despite it being largely unharmed.  174
Thus the story of #5210-005 came to an end as it sat in the Kuwaiti desert eventually to 
be recovered by US Army engineers, and sent back to the United States for evaluation, where it 
eventually ended up at the National Armor and Cavalry Museum at Fort Benning, Georgia, 
displayed as war booty. This was an ignominious end for a vehicle that had served with such 
distinction and with such history behind it. 
* * * 
Iraq under Saddam achieved an impressive level of military and industrial development. 
Saddam himself was a man of unique ambition, charisma, intelligence, callousness, and 
arrogance. While Saddam was a brutal and ruthless dictator, he was also extremely effective at 
achieving his ambitions and had an eye for talent. He assembled a team of Iraqi bureaucrats and 
foreign experts and turned Iraq into a genuinely powerful regional military actor. By 1991 Iraq 
was well on its way to meeting Saddam’s lofty and ambitious goal to reach full self-sufficiency 
by 2000. Amir al-Sadi, Amir al-Ubeidi, Gerald Bull, Hussein Kamil and hundreds or thousands 
more worked, with Saddam at the head, to give Iraq the military independence Saddam believed 
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his country required. The hundreds of foreign governments and corporations who helped build 
Saddam’s war machine despite knowing full well what their contributions would be used for 
were all complicit in the unsavory actions Saddam took with the weapons and technologies they 
helped him build. Iraq’s dual invasions of Iran and then Kuwait would not have been possible 
without these weapons. 
An amorphous series of influences and trends throughout the Cold War resulted in a 
militarization of the developing world. This militarization led, particularly in Iraq, to a sort of 
security dilemma feedback loop, in which a variety of nations helped arm Saddam, thus 
contributing to the perception of Saddam as a threat and then turning around and having those 
very same nations go to war with Saddam. Most of the same countries that swiftly destroyed the 
Iraqi army in 1991 and 2003 were the same powers that happily gave him billions of dollars 
worth of advanced weapons and even more billions in loans knowing full well they would be 
used to chemically murder Iranian soldiers, bomb Iranian cities, and massacre Shia and Kurds 
within Iraq. When British military forces were deployed to fight against Saddam’s army in 
Kuwait in 1990, many units were not issued desert camouflage, as just four years earlier the 
British government had sold those same uniforms to the Iraqi army.  American President 175
Ronald Reagan established full diplomatic relations with Saddam in 1984, at the same time as 
Iraqi aircraft were gassing Iranian troops by the thousand on Majnoon Island. American policy 
towards Iraq during the 1990s was focused, however, on ​preventing ​Iraq from obtaining weapons 
of mass destruction (WMDs), which includes chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein, once 
America and the West’s darling, was no longer politically expedient to support. 
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In 2003, the United States and its allies invaded Iraq once again under the pretext of 
ending Iraq’s WMD program. American forces deposed and executed Saddam Hussein, 
disbanded the Ba’ath party, destroyed what remained of Saddam’s Army, and unleashed an 
as-yet unfinished series of asymmetrical conflicts that have resulted in hundreds of thousands, if 
not millions, of deaths. The only WMDs found in Iraq by occupying American forces were those 
remaining chemical weapons produced in factories built twenty years prior by Germans and paid 
for largely with loans from a myriad of nations, including the United States. In post-2003 Iraq, 
Saddam’s legacy has been supplanted by other forces in the contemporary Iraqi political, 
military, and cultural zeitgeist. 
Yet many of the same military and arms purchasing concerns that Saddam attempted to 
remedy during the peak of his reign have become newly relevant, with Russia, the United States, 
and Iran vying for control over the Iraqi arms market, lucrative once again as Iraq’s military 
grows to face the dual threats of ISIS and unstable regional and internal politics. After the 
invasion, the US had a near-monopoly on the Iraqi arms market, selling the weapons that the US 
has been known for - M1 Abrams tanks, F-16 jets, M16 rifles, and more. These are weapons with 
a reputation for being expensive, finicky, and often deeply intertwined with punishing American 
stipulations on their repair and use that favor American arms manufacturers and contractors. The 
US has also withheld delivery of a large order of F-16 jets for several years despite Iraq already 
having paid for them in cash and sells Iraq the “monkey model” M1 Abrams, without the 
depleted uranium-hardened armor or advanced fire control systems.  Expensive-to-hire 176177
American contractors are required for repair, maintenance, and training. Recently, Russia has 
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gotten a foothold in the Iraqi market, selling T-90 main battle tanks, Russia’s cheaper, smaller, 
easier to use answer to the M1 Abrams, rugged and effective Su-25 ground attack jets. Russia 
has even offered the highly advanced S-400 air defense missile system, much to the 
consternation of American military leaders, who fear losing control over their monopoly of Iraq 
and having Iraq gain the kind of independence such powerful non-American weapons would 
grant it.  178179180
At this point, it must be asked why this matters. Why look at Iraq’s weapons 
development program? The obvious answer is that something similar to the arming of Iraq can, 
has, and will happen again. As this is being written, bombs and missiles made by Raytheon and 
Lockheed Martin in the United States are being used by the Saudi Air Force to launch a horrific 
campaign of terror bombing in Yemen, famously making use of “triple-tap” airstrikes. Such 
strikes are named for the number of times they hit a target; when a target (in Yemen, those 
targets are often schools or crowded marketplaces) is hit by bombs, the emergency responders to 
that first strike are hit by a second round of bombs, and then the funeral for the previously killed 
is hit once again. Hundreds are killed in a single one of these strikes, and they occur weekly. 
Recent American administrations have sold hundreds of billions of dollars worth of weapons to 
Saudi Arabia, knowing full well how those weapons will be used in Yemen.  Saudi Arabia is, 181
as Iraq was in the 1980s, one of the world’s largest arms markets and the Saudi government, like 
that of Saddam Hussein, is at best, callous, unscrupulous, and has little regard for human life. 
The arms companies of the world, and the governments who facilitate those sales, have not 
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learned their lessons from the mustard gas horrors of Majnoon Island, the muddy no-man’s-land 
of al-Fao, or the terror bombing of Tehran. Arms proliferation may result in temporary profit for 
those that take part, but the human costs are uncountable. 
* * * 
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